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Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite 
the Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures 
MICHAEL D. GUTTENTAG* 
Provisions in the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 have made it 
much easier for firms to avoid federal periodic disclosure obligations, but these 
provisions were enacted based upon a virtually nonexistent legislative record and 
upended rules established only after careful consideration almost fifty years 
earlier. Determining when firms should be required to comply with federal periodic 
disclosure requirements is best done in the context of a broader understanding of 
the history and economics of periodic disclosure regulation. This Article provides 
such an understanding. 
The history of periodic disclosure regulation in the United States is traced back 
to its origins in the eighteenth century, and the economic analysis of periodic 
disclosure regulation is updated and refined to incorporate recent findings. 
Building on this historical and economic understanding of periodic disclosure 
regulation, I identify a flaw in the underlying structure of the rules currently used 
to determine when firms must make periodic disclosures. To rectify this structural 
problem, I conclude that firms with a market capitalization of less than $35 million 
or fewer than one hundred beneficial shareholders should be granted an automatic 
exemption from periodic disclosure requirements. All other firms should be 
provided a choice between: (1) complying with federal periodic disclosure 
obligations, or (2) implementing measures that would mitigate the need for 
periodic disclosure regulation, such as severely restricting the tradability of the 
firm’s shares or committing to an acceptable alternative disclosure regime. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article considers when firms in the United States should be required to 
comply with federal periodic disclosure requirements (FPDRs). Firms were first 
federally required to publicly disclose information on an ongoing basis with the 
passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).1 As originally 
enacted, the Exchange Act required all firms with securities traded on a national 
exchange to comply with FPDRs.2 In 1936, the Exchange Act was amended to also 
require most firms to comply with FPDRs once they executed a public securities 
offering.3 In 1964, pursuant to the Securities Act Amendments of 1964 (“1964 
Amendments”), the reach of mandatory compliance with FPDRs was further 
expanded to include firms that had neither listed their securities on a national 
exchange nor carried out a public offering, but that had five hundred or more 
shareholders of record and more than $1 million in assets.4  
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006). Although not addressed in this Article, additional 
obligations may also be triggered when firms are required to comply with the Exchange Act 
periodic reporting requirements, including restrictions on the proxy voting process, trading 
by firm insiders, and tender offer procedures. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION 181 (2d ed. 2006). 
 2. This requirement was achieved indirectly by prohibiting brokers and dealers from 
effecting a transaction on a national exchange involving a security that is not registered 
pursuant to the requirements of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a. 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(B) [hereinafter Rule 12(g)(1)]. Firms with more than $1 
million in total assets and “a class of equity security (other than an exempted security) held 
of record by five hundred or more shareholders” in 1964 were given two years to comply 
with FPDRs, while firms with more than 750 shareholders of record in 1964 were given one 
year to comply with FPDRs. § 78l(g)(1)(A)–(B). 
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The threshold level of five hundred shareholders of record triggering mandatory 
compliance with FPDRs, established by the 1964 Amendments, remained 
unchanged until 2012. In 2012, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS 
Act”) raised the threshold shareholder level triggering mandatory compliance with 
FPDRs from five hundred to two thousand (so long as at least fifteen hundred of 
such shareholders are accredited investors).5 The JOBS Act also excluded from this 
count employees who received shares through a distribution exempt from public 
offering requirements.6 These changes will make it much easier for firms to avoid 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs in the future.7  
After almost eighty years of federal rules requiring firms of various types to 
comply with FPDRs and a recently enacted substantial change to these rules, how 
best to determine when firms should be required to comply with these FPDRs still 
remains largely an enigma. There are three reasons why. First, a comprehensive 
history detailing why the rules used to determine when firms must comply with 
FPDRs were initially adopted and subsequently modified does not exist.8 Second, 
the current scholarship on why firms should be required to make periodic 
disclosures is both incomplete and out of date. Third, no one has yet linked 
legitimate justifications for requiring firms to make periodic disclosures to specific 
criteria for determining which firms are required to comply with FPDRs.9 This 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 
306, 325 [hereinafter JOBS Act]. 
 6. JOBS Act § 502. 
 7. See infra notes 108–18 and accompanying text.  
 8. Various aspects of the relevant history appear in Joel Seligman’s survey of the 
history of securities regulation in the United States, but Seligman does not attempt to identify 
patterns in the issues determining when firms were required to comply with FPDRs over 
time. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (1982). The 
history of the scope of application of FPDRs is also reviewed in the Congressional Report 
prepared in support of the 1964 Amendments, but this history ends prior to 1964. S. REP. NO. 
379, at 6–19 (1963). Finally, a brief, but insightful, review of the relevant history appears in 
Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities 
Regulation After the JOBS Act, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) available at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/976 (manuscript at 6–10). 
 9. However, William Sjostrom, in a four-page article published in March of 2011, 
questioned whether the number of a firm’s shareholders should trigger required compliance 
with FPDRs. William K. Sjostrom, Questioning the 500 Equity Holder Trigger, 1 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 43, 44 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/?p=1028 (arguing that the Rule 
12(g)(1) criteria for when firms must comply with FPDRs should be changed to a rule based 
on the trading volume of the securities in question to avoid unduly burdening firms not 
seeking a “large infusion of equity capital and liquidity for its stock”). 
  Langevoort and Thompson identify several topics and findings relevant to the 
determination of when firms should be required to comply with FPDRs, although the 
primary emphasis of their article is on a proposal to separate firms required to comply with 
FPDRs into two categories: (1) “public” firms, which are firms with “a large public 
footprint;” and (2) “reporting” firms, which are smaller firms. See Langevoort & Thompson, 
supra note 8. Under the Langevoort and Thompson proposal, “public” firms would be 
required to comply with all FPDRs, while “reporting” firms would not be required to comply 
with those provisions of FPDRs that are related to the broader social benefits arising from 
154 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:151 
 
Article addresses each of these three shortcomings, and, by doing so, provides the 
first systematic analysis of how best to determine when firms should be required to 
comply with FPDRs. 
The first Part of this Article revisits the history of securities regulation in the 
United States in order to illuminate the origins of rules used to determine when 
firms must comply with FPDRs. This review uncovers a previously 
underappreciated pattern in the political economy of the regulation of periodic 
disclosures. Understanding this pattern adds a new perspective to the standard 
narrative that periodic disclosure requirements are imposed to protect investors and 
reduce securities fraud.10 The pattern is as follows. Initially, a select group of firms 
voluntarily adopts a practice of committing to make periodic disclosures in order to 
raise low-cost funds from outside investors. Eventually, firms providing investors 
high-quality disclosures become concerned that these disclosures are putting them 
at a disadvantage, both because of the competitive information revealed by their 
disclosures and because their share prices are discounted when traded alongside the 
securities of firms providing less information to investors. To address these 
concerns, the firms providing high-quality disclosures and the exchanges on which 
the securities of these firms are traded lobby for rules to impose similar periodic 
disclosure obligations on otherwise comparable firms. 
This pattern explains much of why certain firms that had neither listed their 
securities on a national exchange nor carried out a public offering were required to 
comply with FPDRs beginning in 1964. Prior to 1964, there were no provisions 
requiring firms with securities traded on over-the-counter markets (“OTC”) to 
comply with FPDRs. The absence of a requirement linking compliance with 
FPDRs to the trading of a firm’s securities on the OTC created an incentive for 
                                                                                                                 
disclosure regulation. See id. at 42–43. Langevoort and Thompson also express a preference 
for a system triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs based the trading volume of a 
firm’s securities. See id. at 26–27.  
  The SEC was in the process of analyzing the question of the appropriate shareholders 
of record threshold level triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs when the JOBS Act 
was passed. Congressman Darrell Issa had sent a letter in 2011 to the SEC with several pages 
of questions about whether the criteria established by Section 12(g) were appropriate in light of 
recent developments in financial markets. Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC (Mar. 22, 2011) at 6–10, 
available at http://www.knowledgemosaic.com/resourcecenter/Issa.041211.pdf. One of Issa’s 
questions was as follows: “Why hasn’t the SEC used its broad exemptive authority to 
modernize or eliminate the 499-shareholder cap?” Id. at 8. Mary Schapiro, the chairman of the 
SEC, in response to Issa’s letter disclosed that the SEC staff was examining the efficacy of the 
criteria set out in Section 12(g). Letter from Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, to Darrell Issa, 
Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform (Apr. 6, 2011) at 17–22, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/schapiro-issa-letter-040611.pdf. Schapiro also observed in the 
letter that “both the question of how holders are counted and how many holders should trigger 
[public disclosures] need to be examined.” Id. at 18 (footnote omitted). Whether the SEC study 
of this issue will continue after the passage of the JOBS Act is unclear. 
 10. See HAZEN, supra note 1, at 13 (“[S]ecurities and the securities markets have been 
particularly susceptible to fraud and manipulation. The various laws that regulate securities 
transactions have been designed to address this susceptibility.”). See also James D. Cox & 
Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s 
Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1818 (2012). 
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firms to have their shares traded on the OTC, rather than on a national exchange. 
By the early 1960s, the majority of equity securities trading in the United States 
was taking place on the OTC.11 Firms with securities traded on the national 
exchanges, and the national exchanges themselves, responded by lobbying for the 
imposition of FPDRs on all “public” firms, regardless of where their securities 
were traded. A combination of a series of scandals, the election of President John 
Kennedy, and a market downturn in 1962 provided the opportunity for these 
influential groups to ensure the passage of legislation extending the reach of 
FPDRs to firms with shares traded on the OTC.12 
However, the influence of the interest groups that had earlier successfully 
lobbied for expanding the reach of periodic disclosure obligations may be waning. 
During consideration of what was to become the JOBS Act, no interest group 
emerged with enough influence to force Congress to carefully consider the costs, as 
well as the benefits, associated with a significant reduction in the reach of federal 
disclosure obligations. The JOBS Act changes to the rules used to determine when 
firms must comply with FPDRs were enacted based upon a virtually nonexistent 
legislative record.13 
The second Part of this Article updates and refines explanations as to why firms 
should be required to comply with FPDRs. Understanding why a particular firm 
should be required to comply with FPDRs is a necessary prerequisite to the 
development of proposals about how best to determine when firms should be 
required to comply with these disclosure obligations. Unfortunately, existing 
scholarship on the efficacy of periodic disclosure regulation does not fully 
incorporate recent empirical findings about the effects of changing the criteria used 
to determine when firms must comply with FPRDs. Nor does the existing 
scholarship on the justifications for periodic disclosure regulation recognize the 
potential relevance to disclosure policy of research showing the multitude of ways 
in which agency costs can lead to the adoption of socially wasteful corporate 
policies in other contexts. 
Updating the scholarship on why periodic disclosures should be regulated 
suggests three legitimate and related justifications for requiring firms to comply 
with FPDRs. First, requiring firms to comply with FPDRs can reduce negative 
spillover effects from the active trading of the securities of firms providing only 
limited amounts of information to investors.14 Second, without regulatory 
intervention, those who control the firm’s disclosure policy may adopt opaque 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See S. REP. NO. 88-379, at 14 (citation omitted). 
 12. See SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 309–16. See also infra notes 80–92 and 
accompanying text. 
 13. The legislative record surrounding the passage of the JOBS Act is discussed infra 
notes 119–32 and accompanying text. Usha Rodrigues makes a similar observation with 
respect to other aspects of the JOBS Act. Usha Rodrigues, JOBS Forum: Score One for 
David’s Interest Group, THE CONGLOMERATE (Apr. 25, 2012), 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/04/jobs-forum-score-one-for-the-david-interest-
group.html (“I am certainly struck, as [Robert Thompson] is, by the lack of cost-benefit 
analysis in picking the numbers for the on and off ramps for emerging growth company 
status.”). 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
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disclosure policies that facilitate self-dealing in ways that are socially wasteful.15 
Third, requiring firms to comply with FPDRs can provide redress from the 
persistent under disclosure that occurs when firms are unable to capture all of the 
benefits their disclosures provide to third parties, most notably to the firm’s 
competitors (these unrealized benefits are “positive interfirm externalities”).16 
The third Part of this Article builds on the historical and economic analysis of 
the first two Parts to generate specific conclusions about how and why to rewrite 
the rules used to determine when firms must comply with FPDRs. The first 
conclusion is that the structure of the rules currently used to determine when firms 
must comply with FPDRs is flawed. The problem with the current system goes 
beyond whether the correct metrics are used to determine when periodic disclosure 
obligations are triggered or whether the triggering thresholds for these metrics are 
set at appropriate levels. The structural problem is that the current system separates 
firms into only two categories: either firms receive an automatic exemption from 
compliance with FPDRs, or firms are required to comply with FPDRs. However, 
there is no good way to establish rules that efficiently separate firms into only these 
two categories.17 
A system in which firms are, instead, separated into three categories with 
respect to compliance with FPDRs would be much more effective. The three-
category mandatory periodic disclosure regime proposed in this Article would 
separate firms into the following three categories: (1) firms that receive an 
automatic exemption from compliance with FPDRs (an existing category), (2) 
firms that receive a contingent exemption from compliance with FPDRs (a new 
category), and (3) firms that are required to comply with FPDRs (an existing 
category). 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. See infra Part II.B. The term “self-dealing” is used in this Article to cover a broader 
range of transactions that can harm outside investors than those described as resulting from 
agency costs, and includes outright fraud. One source of self-dealing costs is the agency 
costs identified by Michael Jensen and William Meckling. Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Jensen and Meckling observe that a self-interested 
agent is likely to maximize his or her own well-being, rather than that of the principal for 
whom he or she is an agent. Id. at 308–09. 
  There are, however, other kinds of self-dealing transactions that do not fall within 
the traditional definition of agency costs, but that nevertheless are transactions that benefit 
insiders to the detriment of outside investors. For example, those who have effective control 
of the firm, but who are not agents of the firm, may extract value from the firm in a way that 
benefits themselves at the expense of other shareholders. The emphasis in scholarship in the 
United States tends to be on agency based self-dealing costs, because share ownership 
generally is widely dispersed, whereas the emphasis in Europe tends to be on the costs of 
extracting private benefits of control, because share ownership is generally more 
concentrated. See Marco Pagano & Ailsa Röell, The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: 
Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public, 113 Q. J. ECON. 187, 188 (1998). 
  Usage of the term “self-dealing” to describe these various types of transactions 
follows Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, 
The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 430–31 (2008). 
 16. See infra Part II.C. 
 17. See infra Part III.A. 
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Under this new three-category system for determining when firms must comply 
with FPDRs, some firms would continue to be granted an automatic exemption 
from compliance with FPDRs; however, this automatic exemption would only be 
granted when there are unlikely to be any significant benefits from requiring 
compliance with FPRDs. Firms that do not qualify for this automatic exemption 
from compliance with FPDRs would then have two options. First, such firms could 
take specified measures to minimize the social costs from persistent under 
disclosure, and, in return for taking these steps, avoid mandatory compliance with 
FPDRs. The specified ameliorative measures involve either having the firm restrict 
the tradability of the firm’s shares or having the firm commit to provide investors 
sufficient amounts of information through an acceptable alternative disclosure 
regime. Firms that do not qualify for an automatic exemption and that do not 
implement one of these ameliorative measures would be required to comply with 
FPDRs.  
This proposed three-category system for determining which firms must comply 
with FPDRs would offer firms a degree of issuer choice about whether to be 
subject to FPDRs missing from the current system, while still insuring that 
evidence-based concerns about persistent market failures in securities markets 
related to periodic disclosure practices are not ignored.18 
There is sufficient information available to offer preliminary guidance about 
how the three-category system for determining when firms must comply with 
FPDRs proposed in this Article should be implemented. First, in terms of when an 
automatic exemption from mandatory compliance with FPDRs should be granted, I 
present evidence that firms with less than $35 million in market capitalization or 
fewer than one hundred beneficial owners should be granted an automatic 
exemption from mandatory compliance with FPDRs.19 
Preliminary guidance can also be provided as to what a firm should be required 
to do in order to qualify for the new contingent exemption from a requirement to 
comply with FPDRs. One pathway for firms to receive this new contingent 
exemption would be for the firm to place significant restrictions on the tradability 
of the firm’s shares, such as only allowing shareholders to transfer their securities 
to family members, affiliates, or back to the firm. An alternative pathway for firms 
to receive this new contingent exemption would be for the firm to participate in a 
disclosure regime other than the one established pursuant to FPDRs, of which there 
are several possible candidates. Determining more precise specifications for each of 
these ameliorative pathways will be challenging, because the deleterious effects 
from a single firm underdisclosing information to investors are difficult to measure. 
However, with the system for granting an exemption from mandatory compliance 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. There already is some element of issuer choice provided by the rules triggering 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs, because firms can take steps to avoid crossing the 
thresholds that trigger periodic disclosure obligations, an observation nicely elucidated in 
John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political 
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531 (2001). But the steps firms currently can take to 
avoid crossing the thresholds that trigger periodic disclosure obligations have little direct 
relationship to the types of measures that can minimize the deleterious effects of market 
failures related to the periodic disclosure of information by the firm. Id.  
 19. See infra Part III.B. 
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with FPDRs properly structured, the correct research questions can be asked, 
answered, and used to better inform policy. 
The passage of the JOBS Act has made it much easier for firms to avoid being 
required to comply with FPDRs. This change represents the first time since the 
Exchange Act was enacted in 1934 that the reach of the federal periodic disclosure 
regime has been rolled back to any significant degree. The analysis here shows that 
the JOBS Act changes, although dramatic, actually failed to address the more 
fundamental structural problem with the system of rules used to determine when 
firms must comply with FPDRs. This Article explains how and why to correct the 
problems that remain with the rules requiring compliance with FPDRs. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Mandated periodic disclosure is now a central feature of federal securities 
regulation in the United States. This aspect of securities regulation represents the 
culmination of hundreds of years of interrelated developments in securities markets 
and securities market regulation. The first objective of this Article is to ascertain 
why periodic disclosure requirements have selectively been imposed on different 
groups of firms over time. 
This review of the history of the application of periodic disclosure requirements 
in the United States separates the discussion into four historical epochs: (1) 
developments related to periodic disclosure practices prior to 1900, (2) the 
emergence of privately enforced mandatory periodic disclosure requirements 
between 1900 and 1934, (3) the federalization of mandatory periodic disclosure 
requirements in 1934, and (4) major developments in the determination of which 
firms are required to comply with FPDRs since 1934. 
This historical review reveals that much of the impetus for imposing periodic 
disclosure requirements on particular types of firms comes from those already 
committed or required to make high-quality disclosures working to ensure that 
otherwise comparable firms make similar high-quality disclosures.  
A. Minimal Periodic Firm Disclosures Prior to 1900 
The public trading of securities began in the United States toward the end of the 
eighteenth century. Various forms of state and federal debt were the primary 
securities traded at the time. The most active trading market for these securities was 
in New York City, and by 1791 there were public auctions of various government 
securities held in New York City twice each day.20 
In 1792, there was a crash in what would now be called the public debt market.21 
In response to the 1792 crash, several states started to regulate these new trading 
markets, marking the first time trading securities was regulated in the United 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. See STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND 
POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690–1860, 138–40 (1998); see also WALTER WERNER & STEVEN T. 
SMITH, WALL STREET 14–18 (1991). 
 21. See BANNER, supra note 20, at 144–45; see also WERNER & SMITH, supra note 20, at 
18. 
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States.22 In New York, legislation was enacted that banned the public auctioning of 
securities and that prohibited the sale of an interest in a security which was not 
owned by the seller at the time of the transaction.23 None of the securities 
regulation measures implemented in response to the 1792 crash contained 
provisions related to the disclosure of information. 
The first half of the nineteenth century saw a transition in securities markets in 
the United States away from the almost exclusive trading of public debt securities 
to markets in which the securities of private enterprises were also traded.24 
Securities regulation during this period was almost exclusively self-imposed. For 
example, some firms chose to put restrictions on the trading of the firm’s securities 
in the firm’s charter.25 A few firms did begin making disclosures about the firm’s 
financial condition or about transactions between the firm and its agents, but there 
was not a common law affirmative duty or other obligation to make such 
disclosures.26 Investors primarily relied on the reputation of those sponsoring a firm 
or the firm’s ability to pay dividends to gauge the value of a firm’s securities.27 
Commentators writing during this period noted the potential benefits that might 
be provided if firms periodically disclosed financial information. A circular drafted 
by a shareholder in the Hope Insurance Company in the 1820s observed that, in the 
absence of disclosure, a firm’s directors could use access to proprietary firm 
information to profit at the expense of outside investors.28 Daniel Raymond, a 
political economist, similarly noted that firm directors “endeavor to keep the 
stockholders and the public in the dark respecting the condition of the corporation, 
while they are themselves in the light. . . . They make no exhibit to the stockholders 
about the actual condition of the company.”29  
In England, a commission headed by William Gladstone suggested that 
“[p]eriodical accounts, if honestly made and fairly audited, cannot fail to excite 
attention to the real state of a concern; and by means of improved remedies, parties 
to mismanagement may be made more amenable for acts of fraud and illegality.”30 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. BANNER, supra note 20, at 171–72. 
 23. Id. at 173–74; WERNER & SMITH, supra note 20, at 18. One irony of the New York 
legislation it that it fostered the growth of securities trading in New York by encouraging the 
formation of private securities exchanges, including the progenitor of the NYSE, where 
systems could be put in place to enforce contracts by private ordering. 
 24. BANNER, supra note 20, at 193. 
 25. Id. at 180 (“Governments often delegated to the enterprises themselves the power 
further to regulate transactions in their own stock.”). The charter provisions of many firms at 
the time “specified how stock was . . . to be subsequently transferred to others.” Id. at 179. 
 26. Id. at 243–44; see also David F. Hawkins, The Development of Modern Financial 
Reporting Practices Among American Manufacturing Corporations, in MANAGING BIG 
BUSINESS 166, 166–67, 183 (Richard S. Tedlow & Richard R. John, Jr. eds., 1986). 
 27. See Jonathan Barron Baskin, The Development of Corporate Financial Markets in 
Britain and the United States, 1600–1914: Overcoming Asymmetric Information, 62 BUS. 
HIST. REV. 199, 210, 222 (1988). 
 28. BANNER, supra note 20, at 199–200. 
 29. DANIEL RAYMOND, THE ELEMENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 276 (4th ed., 1840). 
 30. Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 53, 53 
(citing SELECT COMMITTEE ON JOINT STOCK COMPANIES (1844)). 
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However, the systems necessary to support the widespread adoption of periodic 
disclosure practices and periodic disclosure regulation did not yet exist.  
The elements necessary for firms to provide credible periodic disclosures started 
to emerge in the second half of the nineteenth century. One important development 
during this period was work by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE or 
“Exchange”) to increase the amount of information disclosed by firms with 
securities listed on the Exchange. In 1869, a NYSE committee called for 
“disclosures of financial condition” by firms with securities listed on the 
Exchange.31 From 1870 through the 1890s, this committee required listing firms to 
provide a “statement of condition and a list of officers.”32 
The extent to which firms complied with the evolving NYSE disclosure 
requirements during this period was limited. Part of the reason for the limited 
implementation of these Exchange disclosure requirements was that relationships 
between the NYSE and firms with shares listed on the Exchange were governed by 
individual contracts, and these individual contracts generally did not require 
disclosures by the listed firm.33 Thus, the NYSE “was unable to enforce its 
authority upon recalcitrant listed companies.”34 In fact, many “large and long 
established firms” continued to resist complying with the NYSE periodic financial 
reporting requirements through the 1920s.35 
These NYSE listing requirements provide a first illustration in the United States 
of how a system of periodic disclosure requirements might be imposed on certain 
firms. The NYSE disclosure initiative was likely the result of pressure from firms 
already providing high-quality disclosures. A related example of efforts to create a 
trading venue where firms were of similar quality were efforts to exclude 
noncompliant firms from trading on the NYSE. Prior to 1910, securities could be 
traded on the NYSE, whether or not the issuer complied with the Exchange’s 
listing requirements. In 1910, the NYSE disallowed trading on the Exchange floor 
of unlisted securities.36 Starting in 1910, firms were forced to choose between 
complying with the NYSE’s increasingly stringent disclosure requirements and 
other listing requirements, or losing access to the NYSE trading market.37 
B. The Growing Practice of Periodic Firm Disclosures Between 1900 and 1934 
Between 1900 and 1934, imposing periodic disclosure requirements on firms 
began to emerge as an increasingly viable tool for securities regulation in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. John C. Hilke, Early Mandatory Disclosure Regulation, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
229, 231 (1986) (examining archival materials concerning the NYSE). 
 32. Id.  
 33. S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 5 (1934). 
 34. Hawkins, supra note 26, at 193. 
 35. See Hilke, supra note 31, at 231. 
 36. Id. at 230; Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 
1469 (1997). 
 37. See Mahoney, supra note 36, at 1469. The choice to leave the NYSE had only 
limited adverse consequences for a firm at the time. The trading of the securities of firms 
that were not listed on the NYSE continued just outside of the doors of the NYSE on what 
became the American Stock Exchange. See SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 47. 
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United States. Among the developments supporting the growing viability of 
periodic disclosure requirements as a regulatory tool during this period were: (1) 
the maturation of a disclosure-based model for securities offerings in Britain, (2) a 
growing appetite for inexpensive external financing, (3) the emergence of 
accounting as an independent profession, and (4) the increasing efforts of legitimate 
issuers to differentiate their securities from securities issued primarily for 
fraudulent purposes. Each of these developments is discussed briefly below. 
Developments in securities regulation in Britain in the late 1800s and early 
1900s provided a model for disclosure-based securities regulation in the United 
States.38 Securities trading had begun in Britain well before the emergence of 
similar markets in the United States. As early as 1720, “the [securities] market and 
its participants were established London institutions.”39 By the middle of the 
nineteenth century in Britain, public periodic disclosure of shareholder names and 
addresses was an established feature of English company law.40 In 1867, the British 
Parliament enacted the Companies Act of 1867, which increased the amount of 
disclosure required of companies selling securities to the public. In particular, 
Section 38 of this Act required that firms disclose all significant contracts between 
the firm and its principals prior to a public offering.41 
However, significant loopholes remained in the Companies Act of 1867 that 
were not addressed until the adoption of the Companies Act of 1900. Paul 
Mahoney, a legal historian, concludes the Companies Act of 1900 “was the first 
statute in Anglo-American law to impose comprehensive disclosure requirements 
on companies selling securities to the public.”42 This British legislation would 
provide a crucial model for future American securities regulation.43 
Around the start of the twentieth century, the growing recognition that firms 
could lower the cost of financing their operations by credibly committing to make 
periodic disclosures also supported the adoption of periodic disclosure practices. A 
lower cost of capital would, in turn, provide a crucial competitive advantage during 
this period of intense industry consolidation. In a review of developments among 
industrial firms from 1887 through 1902, Thomas Navin and Marian Sears note that 
“[b]y the turn of the century the transition was well under way from closely held, 
‘inside’ ownership of American business to semipublic, ‘outside’ hands.”44 As 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. Mahoney, supra note 36, at 1049, 1068, 1073, 1074; see James M. Landis, The 
Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 34 (1959); 
WERNER & SMITH, supra note 20, at 11. 
 39. BANNER, supra note 20, at 14; see also WERNER & SMITH, supra note 20, at 11. 
 40. Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1057 (1995). 
 41. Id. at 1063. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Landis, supra note 38, at 34. While British practices may have provided a 
helpful precedent for the implementation in the United States of a system of periodic 
disclosure requirements, the Companies Act of 1900 only addressed the disclosure duties 
associated with public offerings, not ongoing disclosure obligations, and thus provides a 
more direct precedent for the Securities Act. See also Mahoney, supra note 40, at 1073 
(explaining that the Companies Act of 1929 had only “minor changes” from the 1900 Act). 
 44. Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 
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firms committed to disclose more information, a symbiotic relationship began to 
emerge between increased disclosure, lower costs of capital, and more robust 
securities markets.  
A third development supporting the adoption of a securities regulation system 
based on periodic disclosures was the emergence of reliable accounting standards, 
and the related development of accounting as an accredited profession. In 1900, the 
first university accounting department was established at New York University,45 
and, in 1905, competing national accounting organizations were united to form 
what was to become the American Institute of Accountants.46  
The adoption of accounting standards in the United States during this period was 
further advanced by the imposition of a federal income tax in 1913.47 The first 
standards for auditing practices in the United States were published in 1917.48 
David Hawkins, an economic historian, observes that by 1926 the auditing of 
prominent industrial companies was “almost universal.”49 These developments 
increased the ubiquity and reliability of ongoing information about the firm that 
could potentially be made available to investors on a periodic basis. 
A fourth significant antecedent to a securities regulation system in the United 
States was the effort of established players in securities markets to distinguish their 
legitimate capital-raising efforts from fraudulent securities offerings. Throughout 
the 1920s, the Investment Bankers Association of America (IBAA) sought to have 
firms offering securities present information about their operations in a 
standardized manner.50 The IBAA “also suggested, in the case of holding 
companies, that there should be readily available through annual reports” 
information about the firm’s capitalization and balance sheet.51 
The trend toward an increased amount of periodic disclosure was evident in the 
behavior of firms with securities traded on the NYSE. In 1923, only 25% of the 
firms with securities listed on the NYSE provided investors both quarterly and 
annual financial statements.52 By 1933, all of the 1157 NYSE firms provided 
investors annual financial reports, and the majority also provided investors 
quarterly financial reports.53 
Exploratory efforts to enact legislation that would make periodic disclosures 
mandatory in the United States began at the start of the twentieth century. In 1900, 
a committee of investors sent a report to Congress suggesting that legislation be 
enacted which would require certain firms “to publish annually a properly audited 
                                                                                                                 
1887-1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 105 (1955). 
 45. Hawkins, supra note 26, at 184–85. 
 46. Id. at 185 (originally the organization was the American Association of Public 
Accountants). 
 47. Id. at 184 (“complete and accurate accounting records became necessary for income 
tax purposes”) (footnote omitted). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 48. Hawkins, supra note 26, at 186. 
 49. Id. at 187–88 (citing George O. May, Corporate Publicity and the Auditor, 42 J. 
ACCT. 321, 322–23 (1926)). 
 50. See id. at 182. 
 51. Id. at 183. 
 52. SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 48 (explaining “only 242 of the 957 listed firms 
provided both annual and quarterly financial reports”). 
 53. Id. 
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report, showing in reasonable detail their assets and liabilities, with profit or loss; 
such report and audit under oath to be subject to Government inspection.”54 In 
1918, 1919, and 1921, federal bills were proposed to regulate securities markets by 
requiring firms with publicly traded securities to make periodic disclosure, but they 
were not enacted.55  
By the early 1930s periodic disclosures had become an established method in 
the United States with which to inform investors about the firm’s performance, and 
firms already making high-quality disclosures were beginning to press for measures 
to make such disclosures mandatory. 
C. The Federalization of Periodic Firm Disclosure Requirements in 1934 
The federalization of securities regulation in the United States began with the 
passage of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”).56 The Securities Act 
required firms making public offerings of securities to follow a statutorily defined 
procedure, which included the disclosure of all material information about the firm 
and the securities being offered for sale.57 Even at the time of its passage, there 
were, however, obvious limitations to the Securities Act.58 One shortcoming of the 
Securities Act was that firms had no obligation to continue to disclose information 
once the public offering was complete.59 Even opponents of the Securities Act 
expected that any subsequent legislation would include a requirement “for periodic 
corporate reporting.”60  
When President Franklin Delano Roosevelt decided to introduce additional 
federal securities regulation legislation in 1934, a central feature of the legislation 
was a requirement that certain firms be required to make periodic disclosures, 
rather than just the one-time disclosures required under the Securities Act. 
Roosevelt’s decision to introduce a periodic disclosure requirement raised the issue 
of how to determine which firms would be required to comply with these new 
FPDRs. The Exchange Act was targeted at improving the transparency and 
reducing conflicts of interest at the national securities exchanges. At the time, over 
80% of the dollar value of trading in equity securities occurred on a national 
exchange.61 Therefore, it was not surprising when the enacted legislation simply 
imposed periodic disclosure requirements on all firms with securities traded on a 
national exchange.62 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. U.S. INDUS. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON TRUSTS AND INDUSTRIAL 
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 56. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006). 
 57. SELIGMAN, supra note 8, at 70.  
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the statute than Felix Frankfurter.”). 
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The members of the NYSE applauded the idea of imposing periodic disclosure 
requirements on all firms with securities traded on a national exchange. As noted 
above, the NYSE had been trying with mixed success, since 1869, to impose upon 
all of its members a requirement that periodic disclosures be provided to 
investors.63 With the passage of the Exchange Act, the federal government imposed 
periodic disclosure requirements not only on all NYSE-listed firms, but also on the 
larger group of firms with securities listed on any of the national exchanges. 
The enactment of the Exchange Act also provided an opportunity to address the 
fact that, under the Securities Act, firms making public offerings had no ongoing 
disclosure obligations.64 The initial drafts of the Exchange Act required firms that 
registered securities pursuant to the Securities Act to continue to make periodic 
disclosures after their public offering was complete.65 However, political 
challenges to the passage of the Exchange Act required compromise.66 In the final 
Exchange Act legislation, only firms with securities traded on a national exchange 
were required to comply with the new periodic disclosure requirements. 
The authors of the Exchange Act realized that this compromise left the 
disclosure practices of firms without securities traded on a national exchange 
unregulated, and instructed the newly formed Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to investigate how best to address the topic of the regulation of periodic 
disclosures by firms whose securities were not traded on a national exchange, but 
went no further.67 A decision on how to put in place a comprehensive plan to 
address the difficult issue of specifying which firms should be required to comply 
with the newly-created FPDRs was deferred. 
D. Changes Concerning Which Firms Must Make Periodic Disclosures Since 1934 
Since the passage of the Exchange Act, the content of FPDRs has steadily 
evolved, but the criteria used to determine which firms should be required to 
comply with FPDRs have been changed only on rare occasion. 
Four of the major changes since 1934 in the criteria used to determine which 
firms are required to comply with FPDRs are reviewed below. These changes are 
(1) the inclusion in 1936 of a requirement to comply with FPDRs for firms that 
execute a public offering of securities, (2) the inclusion in 1964 of a trigger 
requiring compliance with FPDRs based on a combination of firm size and the 
number of a firm’s shareholders of record, (3) the adoption in 1999 by the SEC of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. See supra notes 32 and 36 and accompanying text. 
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rules requiring compliance with FPDRs by firms with shares traded on the Over-
the-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB), and (4) the passage of the JOBS Act in 
2012, which increased the shareholders of record threshold triggering mandatory 
compliance with FPDRs from 500 to 2000 in many circumstances and excluded 
some firm employee shareholders from this count. 
The first three of these changes expanded the reach of the criteria triggering 
required compliance with FPDRs, and in each case at least part of the impetus for 
the expansion came from firms which were already required to comply with 
FPDRs. The passage of the provisions of the JOBS Act, which reduced the reach of 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs, suggests the power and influence of interest 
groups that had in the past endorsed expanding the reach of mandatory compliance 
with periodic disclosure regulations is declining. 
1. The Exchange Act Amendments of 1936 
The first change to the criteria used to determine which firms must comply with 
FPDRs was enacted in 1936 (the “1936 Amendments”). The 1936 Amendments 
extended reporting requirements to most firms that publicly offered securities in 
compliance with the Securities Act. This change was accomplished by adding 
Section 15(d) to the Exchange Act, which requires compliance with the periodic 
reporting requirements of the Exchange Act “when the aggregate offering price of 
the securities being registered [pursuant to Section 5 of the Securities Act], plus the 
value of the securities of the same class outstanding, amounts to $2 million or 
more.”68 
The 1936 Amendments completed what was generally recognized to be some of 
the unfinished business left over after the passage of the Exchange Act.69 The 
report prepared in conjunction with the 1936 Amendments noted one goal of the 
amendments was “an endeavor to create a fair field of competition among 
exchanges and between exchanges as a group and the over-the-counter markets 
. . . .”70 Another justification offered for such a change was that most of the benefits 
from requiring disclosure by firms at the time of offering their securities publicly 
would continue once the securities of the firm were publicly traded. 
The drafters of the 1936 Amendments recognized that firms that had neither 
completed a securities offering pursuant to the Securities Act nor listed their 
securities on a national exchange could still avoid a requirement to comply with 
FPDRs.71 The primary motivation for the decision in 1936 not to impose any 
disclosure requirements on such firms was political. The SEC chairman at the time, 
James Landis, was concerned about the possibility of a Supreme Court challenge to 
the 1936 Amendment.72 Landis worried that a disclosure requirement applied to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. S. REP. NO. 379, at 15 (1963). The duration of this periodic reporting requirement 
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securities which were neither traded on a national exchange nor sold pursuant to 
federal securities law might not withstand Supreme Court scrutiny.73  
Once again, a decision about how to systematically and consistently determine 
which firms should be required to comply with FPDRs was deferred. 
2. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 
The next significant change in the criteria used to determine which firms must 
comply with FPDRs was enacted in 1964. The 1964 Amendments expanded 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs to firms that had neither offered securities 
publicly pursuant to the Securities Act nor listed their securities on a national 
exchange. 
The enactment of the 1964 Amendments was a slow-in-coming measure to close 
a loophole in the application of FPDRs that was evident even when the Exchange 
Act was originally enacted.74 After the passage of the 1936 Amendments, there 
were still many otherwise comparable firms that would or would not be required to 
comply with FPDRs depending on where their securities were traded. By 1938, 
government officials began to propose methods to address this disparate application 
of FPDRs. Then SEC Chairman William O. Douglas recommended to President 
Roosevelt that all firms “with $1 million or more in assets be subject to the periodic 
disclosure provisions of the 1934 act,” and a 1938 NYSE report proposed making 
such an amendment to the Exchange Act.75 In 1941, the NYSE and the American 
Stock Exchanges proposed that mandatory compliance with FPDRs be required of 
all firms that had at least $3 million in book value and at least 300 shareholders of 
record, but no legislation was proposed.76  
A 1955 Senate report, which considered the issue of whether firms with 
securities traded on the OTC should be required to comply with FPDRs, cited 
several witnesses who: 
[Q]uestioned the “double standard” that exists in the regulation of 
securities on the exchanges and over the counter. An issuer of securities 
registered on a national securities exchange is subject to one set of 
regulations, whereas another issuer in the same industry, of the same 
size, with the same number of securityholders . . . is subject to entirely 
different regulations.77  
Those who ran the national exchanges were clearly dissatisfied with the 
disparate regulatory treatment that depended solely upon where a firm’s securities 
were traded. The 1955 Senate report concluded that “companies whose stocks are 
traded over the counter be required to comply with the same statutory provisions 
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2013] PATCHING A HOLE IN THE JOBS ACT 167 
 
and the same rules and regulations as companies whose stocks are listed on national 
securities exchanges.”78 However, no legislation followed the 1955 Senate report. 
President Kennedy’s appointment of William Cary as chairman of the SEC, a 
series of scandals on the American Stock Exchange, and a substantial downturn in 
the stock market in June of 1962 gave new impetus to efforts to require at least 
some firms with securities traded on the OTC to comply with FPDRs.79 Cary made 
completing “unfinished projects first attempted during the New Deal” his goal for 
the SEC during his tenure.80 He requested and received $750,000 (over $5 million 
in 2011 dollars) from Congress to fund research by a group of academics and 
practitioners on how to improve securities regulation in the United States.81 The 
result was the Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“Special Study”) delivered to Congress in the spring of 
1963.82 
Determining which firms with securities traded on the OTC should be required 
to comply with FPDRs was one of the chief areas of research for the Special 
Study.83 By the time the Special Study commenced, the majority of equity 
securities trading was occurring on the OTC, rather than on the national exchanges. 
In 1961, 61% of the dollar volume of equity securities trading in the United States 
was taking place on the OTC, as compared to only 16% in 1929.84 The Special 
Study group also found that the vast majority (93%) of reported securities fraud 
cases involved firms that were not required to comply with FPDRs.85  
The Special Study concluded that there were at least some firms which had 
neither offered securities publicly nor listed securities on a national exchange but 
which should, nevertheless, be required to comply with FPDRs. The Special Study 
specifically recommended that all firms with at least 300 shareholders of record be 
required to comply with FPDRs, regardless of firm size.86 The Special Study 
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 86. The legislative report concluded that the “selection of a standard of coverage, 
necessarily a matter of judgment, is based on several factors.” S. REP. NO. 88-379, at 19. 
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certain offerings as public offering under the Securities Act, and the fact that the Investment 
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concluded that the number of a firm’s shareholders of record provided, at the time, 
the most reliable proxy for the costs and benefits of periodic disclosure regulation 
and considered, but rejected, alternative measures, such as firm size or the volume 
of trading in a firm’s shares.87 The Special Study estimated that the 300 
shareholders of record threshold level would require an additional 5500 firms to 
comply with FPDRs.88 
The logic driving the Special Study conclusion that certain OTC firms should be 
required to comply with FPDRs was that a level regulatory playing field should be 
provided for similar firms, regardless of where their securities were traded. The 
Senate Report accompanying the 1964 Amendments observed that “[t]here is no 
convincing reason why the comprehensive scheme of disclosure that affords 
effective protection to investors in the exchange markets should not also apply in 
the over-the-counter market.”89 
In the legislation, as finally enacted, the number of shareholders of record 
triggering periodic disclosure requirements was increased to 500, reflecting a 
compromise based on a level proposed by Senator Fulbright in 1955. Also, a 
minimum firm size, measured in terms of balance sheet total assets, was added to 
the criteria below which a firm could receive an automatic exemption from 
compliance with FPDRs.90 As enacted, it was estimated the 1964 Amendments 
would require an additional 3900 firms in the United States to comply with 
FPDRs.91 
With the passage of the 1964 Amendments, the reach of FPDRs was 
substantially expanded to “level the playing field” between the OTC and the 
national exchanges. But again, this time despite access to substantial resources, no 
analytically rigorous answers, beyond the notion of equal treatment for otherwise 
similar firms, were provided to the underlying question of why certain firms and 
not others should be required to comply with FPDRs. 
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3. The Eligibility Rule for OTCBB Stocks Adopted in 1999 
More than thirty years passed after the enactment of the 1964 Amendments 
before another large group of firms was required to comply with FPDRs. In 1999, 
all firms whose shares were traded on the OTCBB were required by SEC rule 
making to comply with FPDRs or exit the OTCBB (“1999 OTCBB Rule”).92 This 
rule was applied regardless of firm size or number of shareholders.93  
Prior to the rule change, approximately 3600 firms had securities traded on the 
OTCBB without complying with FPDRs.94 These firms represented almost half of 
the firms with shares traded on the OTCBB at the time.95 More than three-quarters 
of the firms that were not complying with FPDRs prior to the 1999 OTCBB Rule 
elected to exit the OTCBB market rather than begin complying with FPDRs.96  
The primary impetus for requiring all firms with securities traded on the 
OTCBB to comply with FPDRs came, once again, from other market participants. 
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), which runs the NASDAQ 
exchange, had become concerned that investors were under the false impression 
that securities traded on the OTCBB were similar to and were making disclosures 
comparable to those provided by firms with securities traded on NASDAQ.97 
Neither an analysis of the costs and benefits of imposing FPDRs on a particular 
group of firms nor an analysis of the underlying economic justifications for 
expanding the reach of FPDRs was provided. 
4. The JOBS Act of 2012 
The JOBS Act changed the threshold level of shareholders of record triggering 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs in five ways.98 First, under the JOBS Act, 
shares held by employees who receive their stock pursuant to an employee 
compensation plan exempt from Securities Act public registration requirements 
will not be included in the count of shareholders of record used to determine if the 
number of a firm’s shareholders of record exceeds the threshold level triggering 
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Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12(g) (2011). 
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mandatory compliance with FPDRs.99 Second, the threshold level below which 
firms would not be required to comply with FPDRs is increased to 2000 
shareholders of record.100 Third, and as a caveat to the increase in the threshold 
level to 2000 shareholders of record, firms with more than 499 shareholders of 
record who are not accredited investors will lose their automatic exemption from 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs.101 Fourth, an exclusion from the count of 
shareholders of record is provided for investors who become shareholders through 
a crowd-funding offering.102 The details of this exemption are left to the SEC to 
determine by rule.103 Fifth, banks and bank holding companies receive special 
treatment with respect to the shareholders of record threshold level triggering 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs under the JOBS Act. The limit of 499 non-
accredited shareholders of record does not apply to banks or bank holding 
companies.104 Also, a change was made for banks and bank holding companies 
with respect to the rules regulating exit from the mandatory disclosure regime. 
Specifically, the shareholders of record level below which a firm can exit the 
mandatory periodic disclosure regime was raised from 300 shareholders of record 
to 1200 such shareholders for banks and bank holding companies.105 
The immediate impact of provisions in the JOBS Act which change the 
shareholders of record thresholds triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 99. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 502, 126 Stat. 306, 326 (2012). In order to 
receive this exemption, the employee-owned shares must be issued in compliance with 
Securities Act Rule 701, which requires that the shares be issued pursuant to an approved 
compensation plan, and, if the value of the securities issued exceeds $5 million over a given 
period of time, the firm must also provide the persons receiving the shares information about 
the firm identical to that required when a firm carries out an offering pursuant to Regulation A 
of the Securities Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2011). Regulation A requires firms to provide 
the information set out on Form 1-A, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-a.pdf. 
There is also an obligation under Regulation A to disclose “any other material information 
necessary to make the required statements, in light of the circumstances under which they are 
made, not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(a) (2011). See also, Joan Heminway, Special 
Forum: JOBS Act - Teaching Exemptions, Ralston Purina, Google, and Section 12(g), THE 
CONGLOMERATE (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/04/special-forum-
jobs-act-the-on-ramp-to-publicness-under-section-12g.html. 
 100. See JOBS Act § 501. 
 101. See id. This change means that for the first time firms will need to determine 
whether their shareholders of record are accredited investors. Importing the accredited 
investor concept into this context may prove problematic. It is unclear, for example, why 
firms would not have an ongoing, and potentially quite burdensome, obligation to determine 
whether or not shareholders of record remain accredited over time. Another issue is that one 
shareholder of record may represent the holdings of several beneficial owners. Presumably, 
all such beneficial owners would have to be shown to be accredited for the shareholder of 
record to qualify as an accredited investor. See also Robert B. Thompson, The JOBS Act: 
Raising the Threshold for ’34 Act Obligations, THE CONGLOMERATE (Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/04/the-jobs-act-raising-the-threshold-for-34-act-
obligations.html.  
 102. JOBS Act § 303. 
 103. Id. 
 104. JOBS Act § 601(a). 
 105. Id. 
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likely to be minimal. It is improbable that there are many firms that will elect to 
remain private thanks to the timely passage of the JOBS Act but that were about to 
be required to comply with FPDRs as a result of the old threshold levels. Rather, 
firms have been cognizant of and strategizing about the threshold levels established 
pursuant to section 12(g)(1) of the Exchange Act for some time.106 Firms that had 
already decided to take steps to avoid mandatory compliance with FPDRs will 
simply have the cost of such efforts reduced as a result of the JOBS Act changes.  
If the JOBS Act had implemented a major change in the rules that determine 
when firms can exit from the mandatory disclosure regime, such a change would 
likely have had a more immediate impact. Some already-public firms might have 
chosen to take advantage of lowered barriers to exit, but the JOBS Act made no 
overall changes to the rules governing when firms may exit from the mandatory 
periodic disclosure regime. For example, the text of the JOBS Act suggests that the 
exclusion of certain employee shareholders from the count of shareholders of 
record used to determine whether compliance with FPDRs will become mandatory 
does not apply in the context of determining whether the number of a firm’s 
shareholders of record has fallen below the level under which firms are permitted to 
exit from the mandatory disclosure regime.107 
The longer-term impact of the JOBS Act on the extent to which firms comply 
with FPDRs is, however, likely to be quite significant. The 500 shareholders of 
record threshold had increasingly become the binding constraint, which forced 
firms that otherwise could avoid mandatory compliance with FPDRs to comply 
with these requirements. Several well-known firms, including Facebook, Google, 
and Microsoft, had all chosen to go public, at least in part, because they could not 
easily avoid crossing the 500 shareholders of record threshold that would trigger 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs.108 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Facebook May be Forced to Go Public Amid Market 
Gloom, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2011, at B5 (“LinkedIn, for example, worked with SharesPost, 
the private trading market, to ensure that before its offering, its shares were bought on the 
exchange only by existing investors. Zynga has taken even a stronger stance, refusing to 
register share trades in some instances.”). 
 107. JOBS Act § 502, refers specifically to Rule 12(g)(1) when describing the 
circumstances under which certain employee shareholders are to be excluded from the count 
of shareholders of record, whereas the provisions regarding the threshold levels used to 
determine when a firm can exit from the periodic disclosure regime are set out in 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78l(g)(1), 781(g)(4), 78o(d). 
 108. With respect to Facebook’s decision to go public, the Wall Street Journal identified 
the requirements triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs as the primary motivation of 
Mark Zuckerberg, the Chief Executive Officer of Facebook, in filing for an initial public 
offering (IPO) of Facebook:  
Mr. Zuckerberg’s thinking began changing when Facebook realized in 2010 
that it would have more than 500 shareholders by the end of 2011, which would 
trigger a regulatory requirement that the company start publicly reporting 
financials. Mr. Zuckerberg decided it made more sense for Facebook to go 
public and reap some financial benefit from an IPO.  
Shayndi Raice, Facebook Sets Historic IPO—Potential $10 Billion Deal Would Dwarf 
Google’s; Site Has 845 Million Users, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2012, at A1. With respect to 
Google’s decision to go public, see Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect 
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One of the reasons for the growing importance of the 500 shareholders of record 
threshold is that the other criteria potentially triggering a firm’s obligation to 
comply with FPDRs, namely listing the firm’s securities on a national exchange or 
carrying out a public offering, are increasingly easy to evade. Alternative venues on 
which equity securities can be bought and sold, such as SecondMarket or 
SharesPost, have grown rapidly.109 These alternative venues provide a firm’s 
shareholders some of the benefits of an active trading market for the firm’s 
securities without requiring that the firm’s securities be listed on a national 
exchange. With respect to the ease of avoiding a public offering, opportunities for 
firms to offer securities privately have increased steadily in the United States over 
the past thirty years.110 Firms can now relatively easily raise billions of dollars in 
capital without registering a public offering.111 
Information gathered in the Special Study of securities markets published in 
1963 provides one data point suggesting the potential magnitude of the long-term 
impact of the JOBS Act changes in the number of shareholders of record threshold 
levels triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs.112 The Special Study 
researchers collected information about the number of shareholders of record from 
                                                                                                                 
of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1592 (2006) (explaining that 
Google’s decision to go public was motivated by the need to comply with Rule 12(g)(1)). 
With respect to  Microsoft’s decision to go public, see Bro Uttal, Inside the Deal that Made 
Bill Gates $350,000,000, FORTUNE, July 21, 1986, at 23, 24 (“By 1987, Microsoft estimated, 
over 500 people would own shares, enough to force the company to register with the SEC.”). 
 109. An excellent overview of these marketplaces is provided in Elizabeth Pollman, 
Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 
12–21) (on file with author). See also STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 174 (3d ed. 2012); Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity 
Liquidity, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 27–31), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2066934; Evelyn M. Rusli & Peter Lattman, Losing the Goose That 
Laid the Golden Egg, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at B1; Andrew Ross Sorkin, An Exchange 
Without the Volatility, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2011, at B1. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & 
Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 563 (2005) (describing how new technologies have facilitated competition 
among different venues for delivery of the most efficient trading services); Jose Miguel 
Mendoza, Securities Regulation in Low-Tier Listing Venues: The Rise of the Alternative 
Investment Market, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257 (2008) (calling for the development in 
the United States of trading venues with different levels of regulatory intensity). For a 
description of the business model of SecondMarket, see Examining Investor Risks in Capital 
Raising: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 2–4 (Dec. 14, 2011) (statement of 
Barry E. Silbert, Founder and CEO, SecondMarket). The websites of SecondMarket and 
SharesPost are, respectively, https://www.secondmarket.com/ and https://www.sharespost.com/. 
 110. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A Equity Offerings, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 409 (2008). 
 111. The facility with which funds can be raised privately is likely to be increased further 
as a result of the relaxation of restrictions on public solicitation in the context of a private 
offering in the JOBS Act. JOBS Act § 201; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Goldman Limits 
Facebook Offering to Foreign Clients, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 17, 2011, 8:55 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/goldman-limits-facebook-investment-to-foreign-
clients/ (describing a private equity offering to foreign investors by Facebook). 
 112. For a discussion of the Special Study see supra notes 80–90 and accompanying text. 
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many of the firms with securities traded on the OTC that were not complying with 
FPDRs. Specifically, information on the number of shareholders of record was 
collected from 1610 such firms.113 Of these firms, 31% (507) had between 500 and 
2000 shareholders of record, while only 16% (264) had more than 2000 
shareholders of record.114 This Special Study finding suggests that if the threshold 
level triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs had been raised from 500 to 
2000, such a change would have reduced the number of firms required to comply 
with FPDRs by approximately two-thirds as a result of the 1964 Amendments.115 
There are, however, several reasons why the Special Study findings in this regard 
provide only suggestive evidence as to how firms might be affected by the JOBS 
Act changes.116 
The motivation for including in the JOBS Act such significant changes in the 
criteria used to determine which firms are required to comply with FPDRs is 
unclear. Overall, the JOBS Act had bipartisan support and was easily and quickly 
passed by Congress.117 The general rationale offered for the passage of the JOBS 
Act was that the new law would make it easier for firms to go public in the United 
States.118 However, the specific provisions of the JOBS Act under consideration 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 67, at 19–20. 
 114. Id. at 20 (using provided data to determine percentages). 
 115. There is also evidence supporting the continued relevance of the Special Study 
finding that two-thirds of the firms required to comply with FPDRs as result of the 1964 
Amendments would not have had to comply if the threshold had been increased to 2000 
shareholders of record. In an editorial by John Coates and Robert Pozen challenging the 
advisability of enacting the JOBS Act, Coates and Pozen observe: “More than two-thirds of 
all public companies would be exempt under the bill’s new criterion [regarding when 
compliance with FPDRs is mandatory].” John Coates & Robert Pozen, Editorial, A 
Regulatory Bill That Cuts Investor Protections, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2012, at A13. 
 116. The group of firms studied in the early 1960s and those affected by the JOBS Act 
are distinguishable by many changes in investing and management practices over the past 
fifty years. First, the number of a firm’s shareholders of record is both an imprecise measure 
of beneficial ownership and a measure the characteristics of which have changed 
substantially in the past fifty years. Another confounding factor is that the Special Study data 
did not exclude employee shareholders from the count of shareholders of record, many of 
whom would be excluded in a count made pursuant to the JOBS Act as a result of the 
exclusion for certain employee shares. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. But the 
significance of not excluding employees in the early 1960s may be minimal, since employee 
ownership may have been less common in that earlier era. A further complicating factor is 
that firms can take steps to maintain their shareholders of record count below a given level, 
which was not considered in drawing inferences from the Special Study findings. 
 117. James Freeman, The Weekend Interview with Kate Mitchell: How Silicon Valley 
Won in Washington, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2012, at A13 (quoting Kate Mitchell) (“[P]eople 
who do this for a living say this is shocking how quickly [the JOBS Act] went through.”); 
Phil Mattingly & Robert Schmidt, Startup Act Shows Silicon Valley Clout Growing in DC, 
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-
31/startup-act-shows-silicon-valley-clout-growing-in-dc.html. 
 118. On signing the JOBS Act into law President Obama stated: “For business owners who 
want to take their companies to the next level, this bill will make it easier for you to go public. 
And that’s a big deal because going public is a major step towards expanding and hiring more 
workers.” Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing (Apr. 
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here, those that increase the number of shareholders of record threshold above 
which firms lose an automatic exemption from mandatory compliance with FPDRs, 
would have the opposite effect. Raising this threshold level will likely result in 
fewer firms going public. 
The legislative history surrounding the provisions in the JOBS Act that change 
the threshold level of shareholders of record triggering mandatory compliance with 
FPDRs is quite sparse. The only official written explanation for this aspect of the 
JOBS Act appears indirectly in a House report on the Private Company Flexibility 
and Growth Act (“PCFG Act”).119 The PCFG Act was introduced in the House in 
June of 2011 and appears to have been the genesis for changes in the threshold 
levels triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs included in the JOBS Act.120 
The House report on the PCFG Act stated that the reason to change the 
shareholders of record threshold trigger was to “eliminate one impediment to 
capital formation for small companies.”121 This claim was supported by a reference 
to testimony from Barry Silbert, the chief executive officer of SecondMarket, 
Inc.122 Specifically, Silbert’s testimony is cited for the propositions that the 500 
shareholders of record threshold “created a disincentive for private companies to 
hire new employees, or acquire other businesses for stock,” and “discourages 
companies from providing stock option-based compensation to employees.”123 
There is no discussion of any other potential costs or benefits from changing the 
threshold trigger level in the House report on the PCFG Act.124 
Another source of legislative history related to the change in the shareholders of 
record levels triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs is testimony before 
Congress in 2011 and 2012 about various proposed changes in federal securities 
regulations, such as the PCFG Act, many of which were eventually included in the 
JOBS Act. Hearings were held before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs on December 1, 2011,125 and March 6, 2012,126 before the Senate 
                                                                                                                 
5, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/remarks-
president-jobs-act-bill-signing. The provisions changing the threshold levels triggering 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs were not mentioned in the President’s statement. See id. 
 119. The official reports on the JOBS Act are listed as H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, pt. 1 (2012) 
and H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, pt. 2 (2012). These reports make no mention of the provisions 
related to changes in threshold levels triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs. The Private 
Company Flexibility and Growth Act, H.R. 2167, 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr2167ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr2167ih.pdf. A companion 
bill to the PCFG Act was introduced in the Senate as S. 1824 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s1824is/pdf/BILLS-112s1824is.pdf. 
 120. The section of the JOBS Act dealing with the change in threshold levels triggering 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs, among other similarities, is titled Private Company 
Flexibility and Growth. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).  
 121. H.R. REP. No. 112-327, at 2 (2011). 
 122. See id. It should be noted that Silbert’s firm had an interest in seeing the threshold 
level raised. See infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 123. H.R. REP. No. 112-327, at 2 (2011). 
 124. See id. 
 125. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=a96c1bc
1-b064-4b01-a8ad-11e86438c7e5. 
 126. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors, Part II: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012), available at 
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Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment on December 14, 2011,127 
and before the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises on September 21, 2011,128 and December 15, 2011.129 
In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and 
Investment, Professor John Coates of Harvard Law School stated that of the various 
proposed changes in federal securities regulations, the provisions changing the 
shareholders of record trigger were “the riskiest proposals being discussed” and 
provided an example of “radical deregulation.”130 Despite this testimony by a 
leading securities regulation scholar that the threshold-changing aspects of the 
proposed legislation raised serious concerns, there is no evidence of further 
analysis of these provisions before their inclusion in the JOBS Act.  
The virtually nonexistent legislative history surrounding a major change in the 
shareholders levels triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs stands in stark 
contrast to the substantial investment made in research and analysis when these 
provisions were originally enacted. The paucity of a legislative history for this 
aspect of the JOBS Act quite naturally raises questions about which interest groups 
stood to gain the most from these changes and about what happened to the interest 
groups that had originally supported the adoption of the 1964 Amendments.131  
There appear to be two constituencies that will materially benefit when it 
becomes easier for firms to avoid mandatory compliance with FPDRs. First, firms 
that run private exchanges for the trading of the securities of firms that do not 
comply with FPDRs should benefit from these JOBS Act changes.132 Many more 
firms will probably allow their securities to be traded on these secondary private 
                                                                                                                 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=491a85df
-6940-4074-8b6e-934617c1b292. 
 127. Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., 
and Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=5cfcdde0
-849d-4dac-8643-d5ead01027d8. 
 128. Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job 
Creation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/ 
Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=260088. 
 129. H.R. 3606: The Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth 
Companies Act of 2012: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t. 
Sponsored Enters. of the Hous. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=271846. 
 130. Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising, supra note 127 (statement of Professor 
John C. Coates IV, Harvard Law School). Coates also suggested the need to use a better 
measure of share ownership than the increasingly antiquated concept of “record holders,” 
and offers as alternatives a firm’s public float or market valuation. Id. at 19–20. 
 131. With respect to investments in research prior to the enactment of the 1964 
Amendments, see supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 132. J.J. Colao, Breaking Down the JOBS Act: Inside the Bill that Would Transform American 
Business, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2012, 11:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2012/ 
03/21/jobs-act/ (“The JOBS Act, as passed by the House, would raise this shareholder cap to 2000. 
Private secondary market companies like SecondMarket and Sharespost would benefit substantially 
from this reform, as it would likely lead to a larger, more robust market for the shares of private 
companies.”). 
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equity markets as a result of the changes in the shareholders of record threshold 
levels triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs. It is notable that Barry 
Silbert, the CEO of SecondMarket, Inc., not only testified before both Senate 
committees considering changing the shareholders of record threshold level 
triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs, but also hired a lobbyist, made 
personal campaign contributions to Representative David Schweikert, the original 
sponsor of the PCFG Act legislation, and attended the presidential signing 
ceremony for the JOBS Act.133 
The second group of firms that will benefit from an increase in the shareholders 
of record threshold trigger are those types of firms that have a comparatively larger 
number of shareholders of record. There are at least two types of firms that fall into 
this category: technology firms and financial institutions. Technology firms, 
especially those based on the West Coast or that are venture capital-backed, have 
an established tradition of granting permanent equity compensation to firm 
employees.134 One consequence of this practice is that, after some time passes or 
the firm grows, the firm will tend to have a larger and larger number of 
shareholders of record. To address concerns that granting equity-based 
compensation might trigger disclosure obligations, the SEC had allowed firms to 
exclude employee-held options from the count of shareholders of record for the 
purposes of determining whether a firm would be required to comply with 
FPDRs.135 This exemption did not, however, extend to employee holdings that were 
converted from options into stock. As noted above, technology firms Facebook, 
Google, and Microsoft had each chosen to go public, at least in part, because they 
could not easily avoid crossing the 500 shareholders of record threshold.136 Interest 
groups tied to the venture capital community were among the most ardent 
supporters of the JOBS Act.137 Active, public supporters of the JOBS Act included 
Steve Case, the former chief executive officer of America Online, and Katherine 
Mitchell, a recent past chairman of the National Venture Capital Association.138 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. With respect to hiring a lobbyist, see Mattingly & Schmidt, supra note 117, at 1 (“Israel 
Klein, a lobbyist at the Podesta Group in Washington, who helped lead the charge for the law on 
behalf of his client SecondMarket Inc.”). The record of contribution is available at 
http://www.newsmeat.com/fec/bystate_detail.php?st=NY&last=Silbert&first=Barry. See also 
Pollman, supra note 109, at 45–46. With respect to attending the signing ceremony, see Barry 
Silbert, SecondMarket Q1 Business Update, SECONDMARKET BLOG (Apr. 2012), 
http://blog.secondmarket.com/post/21393666333/secondmarket-q1-business-update. 
 134. See Steven M. Davidoff, A Clash of Cultures Tarnishes a Romance in Silicon 
Valley, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011, at B5 (“The convention in Silicon Valley is that once 
vested, options are kept by employees even if they leave.”). 
 135. See Exemption of Compensatory Employee Stock Options from Registration Under 
Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56887, 
17 C.F.R. § 240 (Dec. 7, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/34-
56887.pdf. 
 136. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Mattingly & Schmidt, supra note 117 (“[The passage of the JOBS Act] had 
more to do with the growing political sway of emerging technology companies and Silicon 
Valley venture capitalists . . . .”). 
 138. With respect to Steve Case’s role, see Olga Khazan, With Passage of JOBS Act, 
Steve Case, AngelList Founder and Others Look Forward to a Less-Regulated Start-Up 
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A second type of firm that tends to have a disproportionately large number of 
shareholders is financial institutions, which have had a history of community 
ownership. Bank groups had historically lobbied for a change in the shareholders of 
record threshold and were granted, pursuant to the JOBS Act, a change not only in 
the threshold level triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs, but also in the 
threshold level determining when a firm could choose to end its compliance with 
FPDRs.139 
Although objections to various aspects of the JOBS Act were voiced,140 the 
provisions regarding the changes in the criteria triggering mandatory compliance 
with FPDRs received relatively little mention at the time of the law’s passage. The 
constituencies that had driven for the steady expansion of the reach of mandatory 
compliance with FPDRs throughout the twentieth century appear now to no longer 
have either the interest or appetite to fight to maintain or expand the reach of 
FPDRs.141 
A review of the history of periodic disclosure regulation in the United States 
illuminates part of the dynamic which had led to a steady expansion in the types of 
firms required to comply with FPDRs throughout the twentieth century. Firms 
already committed or required to provide high-quality periodic disclosures worked 
to expand the types of firms compelled to make such disclosures in order insure a 
“level playing field” with respect to disclosure obligations. More recently, this 
coalition appears to be breaking down, as evidenced by the passage of the JOBS 
Act, which benefits a comparatively small group of firms and was passed with 
virtually no consideration of the greater social costs such a change might impose. 
Uncovering the political economy of periodic disclosure regulation in the United 
States, while informative, ultimately fails, however, to resolve the normative 
question of how best to determine when firms should be required to comply with 
FPDRs. Neither the proponents nor the opponents of imposing FPDRs on various 
                                                                                                                 
World, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small-
business/jobs-act-passes-case-any-time-theres-change-theres-going-to-be-
concern/2012/03/27/gIQAJJheeS_story.html. With respect to Katherine Mitchell’s role, see 
supra note 117. 
 139. With respect to bank lobbying efforts for the JOBS Act, see Kate Ackley, JOBS Act 
Shows Banks Still Have Clout, ROLL CALL (Mar. 8, 2012 1:47 PM), 
http://www.rollcall.com/news/jobs_act_shows_banks_still_have_clout-212990-1.html. With 
respect to special treatment of banks and bank holding companies under the JOBS Act, see 
supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
 140. See Coates & Pozen, supra note 115; David S. Hilzenrath, JOBS Act Poses Risk for 
Investors, SEC Chair Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2012, at A13; Floyd Norris, Paving Path 
to Fraud on Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2012, at B1; Kathleen Pender, Democrats Back 
Bill Weakening Financial Reforms, S.F. CHRONICLE, Mar. 11, 2012, at D1; Editorial, They 
Have Very Short Memories, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, at SR10; Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, 
SEC, Public Statement by Commissioner: Investor Protection is Needed for True Capital 
Formation: Views on the JOBS Act (Mar. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch031612laa.htm.  
 141. One could speculate that changes both in political fundraising practices and 
securities trading technologies can explain this diminished influence. For example, both 
Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 8, at 15–16, 18, and Macey & O’Hara, supra note 109, 
at 570–81, note how advances in trading technology have led to a demise in the power of 
securities exchanges generally. 
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types of firms have offered arguments that facilitate a systematic evaluation of 
when certain firms should be required to comply with FPDRs. 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF PERIODIC DISCLOSURES REGULATION  
This Part provides a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of justifications for 
requiring firms to make periodic disclosures. Such an analysis provides the 
foundation necessary to make recommendation as to how best to structure the rules 
used to determine when firms should be required to comply with FPDRs. The 
discussion below is not intended as a rejection of arguments historically used to 
justify securities regulation, such as the need to protect investors or to maintain 
confidence in securities markets.142 Rather, the analysis below offers a way to 
formulate such concerns with a degree of precision that is both more amenable to 
empirical verification and more helpful in developing specific policy proposals. 
I identify three legitimate and related justifications for requiring certain firms to 
make periodic disclosures. These three justifications are: (1) periodic disclosure 
regulation can mitigate negative spillover effects that may be produced by the 
trading of the securities of firms providing only limited amounts of information to 
investors, (2) the regulation of periodic firm disclosures can increase social welfare, 
if those who control the firm’s disclosure policy would otherwise adopt inefficient, 
opaque disclosure policies in order to facilitate self-dealing, and (3) regulating a 
firm’s periodic disclosures can provide redress for the systematic underdisclosure 
that otherwise occurs when firms are unable to realize the benefits their disclosures 
provide to third parties, most notably their competitors.143 Each of these 
justifications can be shown by the available evidence to generate positive benefits 
when FPDRs are imposed on a group of firms. Each of these three justifications is 
also germane to a determination of which firms should be required to comply with 
FPDRs. 
Scholars have offered many justifications for imposing disclosure requirements 
on certain firms other than the three endorsed above. Among the notable 
justifications for disclosure regulation, which are not included in the analysis here 
of which firms should be required to comply with FPDRs, are the arguments that: 
(1) periodic disclosures requirements offer firms a way to make a credible 
commitment to ongoing accurate and timely disclosures, (2) government 
supervision of the regulation of periodic disclosures provides firms a way to 
inexpensively access public enforcement of their disclosure commitments, (3) 
periodic disclosure regulation helps to ensure that investments in the production of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 2–3 (12th ed. 2012). 
 143. One way to understand the three justifications for periodic disclosure regulation 
provided in this Article is to observe that each of the justifications identified here addresses a 
different market failure. The negative spillovers justification assumes that investors are 
unable to easily distinguish between high-quality and low-quality disclosure firms and that 
firms do not internalize the potential systemic harm caused by under disclosure. The 
reducing self-dealing justification assumes that insiders do not bear the full costs of adopting 
opaque disclosure policies. The interfirm externalities justification assumes that firms are not 
able to capture all of the benefits provided by their disclosures. 
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information about public firms are made at a more efficient level, and (4) periodic 
disclosure regulation provides a way to limit harms to society that might be caused 
by the otherwise unfettered actions of large firms. For various reasons discussed 
below, I do not include these four notable justifications for disclosure regulation 
when considering when particular firms should be required to comply with FPDRs.  
Before discussing the justifications for periodic disclosure regulation both 
included and excluded from the analysis here, it is necessary to understand the 
costs and benefits involved when a firm commits to make periodic disclosures. This 
is a topic that has been considered extensively by both financial economists and 
legal scholars.144 
The primary benefit to a firm from committing to make periodic disclosures 
about firm operations appears to be that such a commitment can lower the cost to 
the firm of raising funds from outside investors.145 Investors are willing to provide 
the firm funds at a lower cost in exchange for a credible commitment to make 
periodic disclosures because such a commitment will increase share price accuracy 
and reduce self-dealing by those who own the firm.146 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. See Ronald A. Dye, An Evaluation of “Essays on Disclosure” and the Disclosure 
Literature in Accounting, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON 181 (2001); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 707–14 
(1984); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is 
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Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure]; Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a 
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2532–52 (1997); 
Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public 
Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 132–42 (2004) [hereinafter Guttentag, Imposing 
Disclosure Requirements]; Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities 
Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 773–76 (1995); Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on 
Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97 (2001). 
 145. See Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia, Disclosure, Liquidity, and the 
Cost of Capital, 46 J. FIN. 1325 (1991); David Easley & Maureen O'Hara, Information and 
the Cost of Capital, 59 J. FIN. 1553 (2004); Michael D. Guttentag, Accuracy Enhancement, 
Agency Costs, and Disclosure Regulation, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 611, 625–27 (2007) 
[hereinafter Guttentag, Accuracy Enhancement]; Richard A. Lambert, Christian Leuz & 
Robert E. Verrecchia, Information Asymmetry, Information Precision, and the Cost of 
Capital, 16 REV. FIN. 1 (2011); Christian Leuz & Robert E. Verrecchia, The Economic 
Consequences of Increased Disclosure, 38 J. ACCT. RES. 91 (2000). But see Anne Beyer, 
Daniel A. Cohen, Thomas Z. Lys & Beverly R. Walther, The Financial Reporting 
Environment: Review of Recent Literature, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 296, 307–10 (2010) 
(reviewing weaknesses in the arguments linking increased disclosure to a lower cost of 
capital).  
 146. These two benefits from disclosure, albeit in the context of disclosure at the time of 
an offering, were recognized as early as 1933. William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The 
Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 172 (1933) (“Thus the effects of [the 
Securities Act], though important, are secondary and chiefly of two kinds: (1) prevention of 
excess and fraudulent transactions, which will be hampered and deterred merely by the 
requirement that their details be revealed; and (2) placing in the market during the early 
stages of the life of a security a body of facts which, operating indirectly through investment 
services and expert investors, will tend to produce more accurate appraisal of the worth of 
the security if it commands a broad enough market.” (footnote omitted)). 
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The way in which increased disclosure by the firm can increase share price 
accuracy is straightforward. Easy access to reliable and up-to-date information 
about the performance of the firm’s businesses will increase the price accuracy of 
the firm’s securities.147 The link between periodic disclosures and a reduction in 
self-dealing is more complex because a firm’s commitment to make periodic 
disclosures can reduce self-dealing by firm insiders in different ways. First, a 
commitment to make periodic disclosures can deter firm insiders from acting in a 
self-interested or untoward manner.148 Felix Frankfurter noted this potential benefit 
from disclosure requirements shortly after the passage of the Securities Act: 
The existence of bonuses, of excessive commissions and salaries, of 
preferential lists and the like, may all be open secrets among the 
knowing, but the knowing are few. There is a shrinking quality to such 
transactions; to force knowledge of them into the open is largely to 
restrain their happening. Many practices safely pursued in private lose 
their justification in public.149 
A second way in which heightened disclosure requirements may reduce self-
dealing is through the moderating effects of an improvement in share price 
accuracy. As noted above, more accurate, timely, and reliable disclosures lead to 
more accurate share prices.150 More accurate share prices should, in turn, reduce the 
opportunities insiders have to profit from exclusive access to firm information.151 
The costs to a firm resulting from a commitment to make periodic disclosures 
can be separated into four categories. The first category is the direct administrative 
and implementation costs of making periodic disclosures. The second category of 
costs includes the various distortions in a firm’s operating policy that may result 
from the public disclosure of firm information. One example of such distortions is 
provided by research by John Asker and his colleagues.152 Asker and his colleagues 
find that public firms consistently underinvest in business opportunities as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. The benefits to selling shareholders from improved share price accuracy are 
modeled in Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 
77 VA. L. REV. 945, 987–92 (1991). 
 148. The experimental evidence on the potential prophylactic benefit of a disclosure 
requirement is mixed. See Michael D. Guttentag, Christine L. Porath & Samuel N. Fraidin, 
Brandeis’ Policeman: Results from a Laboratory Experiment on How to Prevent Corporate 
Fraud, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 239, 244 (2008) (finding a strong inhibitory effect of a 
disclosure treatment in a setting crafted to mirror some of the salient features of corporate 
fraud). But see Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on Coming 
Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005) 
(finding a disinhibitory effect of a disclosure treatment in a setting crafted to mirror a 
conflict of interest transaction). 
 149. Frankfurter, supra note 30, at 55. 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 147. 
 151. See, e.g., David Aboody & Baruch Lev, Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider 
Gains, 55 J. FIN. 2747 (2000). 
 152. John Asker, Joan Farre-Mensa & Alexander Ljungqvist, Comparing the Investment 
Behavior of Public and Private Firms (July 29, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jasker/AFML.pdf. 
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compared to otherwise similarly situated firms that are private.153 The third 
category of costs to a firm from a commitment to make periodic disclosures is 
competitive disadvantaging, which may result when a firm reveals information that 
benefits the firm’s competitors to the firm’s detriment. This third category of costs 
is important from a regulatory perspective, because these competitive 
disadvantaging costs of disclosure tend to be significant from the perspective of the 
affected firm, but not from a social welfare perspective.154 One firm’s loss in 
competitive advantage is another firm’s gain. The fourth category of costs of 
periodic disclosures includes the costs that are only borne by the firm’s insiders 
who, with less disclosure, can benefit more from their privileged access to firm 
information. As with the third category, these insider costs of disclosure may be 
significant from a regulatory perspective, because costs to insiders from disclosures 
that reduce self-dealing opportunities are likely to be more than offset by gains 
realized by the firm’s other shareholders. 
This overview of the costs and benefits of a firm’s periodic disclosures informs 
the discussion below of justifications for requiring these types of periodic 
disclosures. 
A. Regulating Periodic Disclosure as a Way to Reduce Negative Spillover Effects 
One justification for the regulation of a firm’s periodic disclosures is that such 
regulation can reduce the negative spillover effects caused by the active trading of 
the securities of firms providing only limited amounts of information to investors. 
Two different kinds of negative spillover effects from the trading of such securities 
may give rise to concerns that justify regulatory intervention: harms that are venue 
specific and harms that are economy wide. 
The trading of the securities of firms providing limited amounts of information 
to investors could have venue-specific negative spillover effects, because of the 
potential difficulty in distinguishing between high-quality and low-quality firms on 
a particular venue. If investors either have difficulty or are unwilling to invest the 
resources necessary to distinguish between these two types of firms, a rational 
investor will pay a price for a given security traded on a particular venue based on 
average firm quality on that particular venue. This investor behavior reduces the 
incremental benefits to a firm providing higher quality disclosures, potentially 
imposing an uncompensated cost on firms that continue to make these high-quality 
disclosures. Concerns about venue-specific negative spillover effects help to 
explain the efforts of exchanges to exclude from their venues firms that provide 
investors only limited amounts of information, such as when the NYSE excluded 
trading of nonlisted shares in 1910.155 
One recent study provides information about the potential magnitude of venue-
specific negative spillover effects from the trading of the securities of firms 
providing limited amounts of information to investors. Brian Bushee and Christian 
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 154. Guttentag, Imposing Disclosure Requirements, supra note 144, at 145–46. 
 155. See supra notes 37 and accompanying text. 
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Leuz studied the impact of the 1999 OTCBB Rule on the many firms affected.156 
At the time of the enactment of the 1999 OTCBB Rule, many of the firms with 
securities traded on the OTCBB were already complying with FPDRs, while many 
other of the firms with securities traded on the OTCBB were not complying with 
FPDRs. Therefore, the implementation of the 1999 OTCBB Rule provides an 
opportunity to study externalities caused by the trading of the securities of firms 
providing different amounts of information on the same venue. 
Bushee and Leuz found that the securities of firms traded on the OTCBB that 
had already been complying with FPDRs “experience[d] positive stock returns and 
permanent increases in liquidity” as a result of the requirement that previously 
noncompliant firms with securities traded on the OTCBB either begin to comply 
with FPDRs or exit the OTCBB.157 The magnitude of the positive externality 
observed when firms that had not previously complied with FPDRs either did so or 
exited OTCBB was measured by observing the impact of the announcements and 
implementation of the 1999 OTCBB Rule on the valuations of firms that were 
listed on the OTCBB and were already complying with FPDRs.158 The stock prices 
of the 1360 firms in this category went up, on average, over 3% in response to 
news of the implementation of the 1999 OTCBB Rule, providing statistically 
significant evidence that investors anticipated gains from this rule change for firms 
that were already complying with FPDRs.159  
From a static perspective, the overall social welfare effects of these venue-
specific negative spillover effects may not appear especially problematic. In the 
absence of regulatory intervention, if investors based valuations on the average 
level of disclosure, then some firms, those providing low-quality disclosures, may 
experience benefits, just as other firms, those providing high-quality disclosures, 
may experience losses. However, from a dynamic perspective, the consequences of 
venue-specific negative spillover effects become more problematic for reasons 
related to the dynamic referred to as the “lemons” problem.160 If investors do not 
distinguish between firms that make high-quality and low-quality disclosures, then 
firms providing high-quality disclosures will choose to exit the market rather than 
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure 
Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. ACCT. & ECON. 233 (2005). For an 
overview of the 1999 OTCBB Rule, see supra Part I.D.3. 
 157. Bushee & Leuz, supra note 156, at 233–34. 
 158. Id. at 249. 
 159. Id. at 250 tbl.4 (an indication of a statistically significant positive return for the 
already compliant firms of 3.4% appears in the column in this table labeled “Already 
Compliant” and in the row labeled “Mean cumulative return-Small Cap cumulative return,” 
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implemented. Id. at 254. 
 160. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (the “lemons” problem refers to the collapse of a 
market in which it is difficult for purchasers to distinguish between low-quality and high-
quality products, such as may occur in the market for used automobiles, if purchasers cannot 
determine which cars have a history of mechanical difficulties). 
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face an unwarranted discount. The result can be a race to the bottom that may 
explain the recent difficulties experienced by several exchanges in Europe geared 
toward raising funds for firms in a less regulated environment.161 Preventing such 
an undesirable outcome provides a legitimate justification for requiring a minimum 
level of periodic disclosure, at least before allowing a given firm’s securities to be 
traded on a particular venue. 
A second type of negative spillover effect from the trading of the securities of 
firms that provide only limited amounts of information to investors may affect the 
entire economy. There are various ways in which inaccurate share prices that could 
result from inadequate disclosures might harm the overall economy.162 Concerns 
about the deleterious, economy-wide effects of the trading of the securities of firms 
making limited disclosures to investors were a motivation for federalizing the 
regulation of securities markets in the 1930s.163 Concerns about how “the 
performance of the securities markets affects the well-being of the economy” were 
also cited as an important motivation for the decision to expand the reach of FPDRs 
in 1964.164 More recently, some have hypothesized that one of the causes of the 
economic downturn in 2008 may have been inadequate disclosure practices. 
Economist Luigi Zingales, for example, noted that there was no disclosure 
regulation in the credit default swap market, and others have argured that the lack 
of transparency in the credit default swap market contributed to the downturn in 
2008.165 
The venue-specific and economy-wide negative spillover effects from the 
trading of the securities of firms providing investors only limited amounts of 
information provide a justification not only for periodic disclosure regulation but 
also for compulsory periodic disclosure regulation. There are two ways in which to 
implement a regulatory scheme involving periodic disclosure obligations. On the 
one hand, firms might be given the option to elect to comply with FPDRs (an 
“elective” regime). On the other hand, firms might be required to comply with 
FPDRs (a “compulsory” regime). The topic of this Article is why and how to 
implement a compulsory disclosure regime because the question addressed here is 
when firms should be required to comply with FPDRs, rather than just be given an 
opportunity to comply with FPDRs. 
The reasons why economy-wide negative spillover effects justify not only 
periodic disclosure regulation, but also compulsory periodic disclosure regulation, 
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are straightforward. First, firms have no incentive to internalize potential economy-
wide negative spillover effects.166 The reasons why venue-specific negative 
spillover effect may justify compulsory periodic disclosure regulation are of more 
recent vintage. In the past, private ordering offered a powerful tool to address many 
of the venue-specific negative spillover effects from the trading of the securities of 
firms providing limited amounts of information to investors.167 However, the power 
of private exchanges, and, therefore, their ability to dictate the disclosure policies 
of firms with securities traded thereon, has diminished significantly with the rapid 
evolution of trading technologies.168 Private exchanges no longer have the market 
power to force firms to adopt disclosure policies that internalize the costs of venue-
specific negative spillover effects.169 
Negative spillover effects from the trading of securities providing investors only 
limited amounts of information that are both venue-specific and economy-wide 
impose tangible costs that may justify imposing disclosure requirements on at least 
some firms. 
B. Regulating Periodic Disclosure as a Way to Reduce Self-Dealing 
A second justification for the regulation of firm periodic disclosure policies 
arises out of the link between periodic disclosure policies and self-dealing by firm 
insiders. As noted above, it is generally agreed that the commitment to and 
subsequent practice of providing investors high-quality periodic disclosures will 
reduce self-dealing by a firm’s insiders.170  
However, arguments about why periodic disclosure policies need to be regulated 
in order to realize these benefits are much less well-developed.171 The likelihood 
that a commitment to make periodic disclosures will reduce self-dealing does not, 
by itself, provide a justification for regulatory intervention. In the absence of 
further complications, firms should adopt periodic disclosure policies that 
maximize the value of the firm by selecting the optimal trade-off between periodic 
disclosures and self-dealing. The argument for periodic disclosure regulation as a 
way to address agency costs, as it currently stands, is incomplete and cannot 
provide useful guidance for determining which firms should be required to comply 
with FPDRs to address self-dealing costs.172 
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To justify the regulation of a firm’s disclosure policy as a way to reduce self-
dealing it is necessary to also show that there are persistent and widespread market 
failures, which allow firm insiders to benefit personally by adopting opaque 
disclosure policies. How those who establish the firm’s disclosure policy might 
personally benefit by establishing disclosure policies that involve systematic under 
disclosure is the crucial, unanswered question.173 While this question has received 
little consideration in the context of explaining why firms might adopt opaque 
disclosure policies to facilitate self-dealing, in other areas of research on corporate 
governance explanations as to how wasteful policies that facilitate self-dealing can 
survive and flourish has received considerable attention. The ways in which 
aggregate firm value can be reduced, because of the divergence between the 
interests of those who manage or control the firm and outside investors, has been 
studied in the context of: (1) the choice of a state in which to incorporate the 
firm,174 (2) the decision of whether to adopt anti-takeover provisions,175 and (3) the 
determination of executive compensation levels.176 Findings from research on how 
those who manage or control the firm may profitably select policies that do not 
maximize firm value in these other contexts can be extended to explain how firm 
insiders might be able to personally benefit from the adoption of opaque disclosure 
policies. 
The work of Michal Barzuza on the growing number of firms that choose to 
incorporate in Nevada is of particular relevance to the analysis of which firms 
should be required to make periodic disclosures as a way to reduce the costs of 
adopting inefficiently opaque disclosure policies.177 Barzuza finds that firms that 
incorporate in Nevada, where restrictions on self-dealing are more limited, tend to 
be those where insider control of the firm is greater and where the power of outside 
investors, provided by mechanisms such as large block shareholders or institutional 
holders, is lesser.178 Barzuza’s findings suggest the kinds of situations in which 
those who control the firm are more likely to adopt opaque disclosure policies that 
do not maximize firm value. Extrapolating from Barzuza’s findings suggests that 
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firms for which insider control of the firm is greater or where the power of outside 
investors is lesser are more likely to be firms for which imposing FPDRs will 
increase firm value. 
Whether firm’s insiders do, in fact, adopt opaque disclosure policies to facilitate 
self-dealing in a way that reduces firm value is an empirical question amenable to 
direct measurement. If requiring firms to comply with FPDRs reduces the 
incidence of inefficient self-dealing, then the value of the firm should increase 
when the firm is required to comply with FPDRs. Studies of the effects of the 
original passage of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act do not provide 
evidence of the type of gain in share prices after the imposition of FPDRs that 
would indicate disclosure requirements can efficiently reduce self-dealing by firm 
insiders.179 However, failing to find evidence of an effect is not the same as finding 
evidence that there is no effect. There are many factors that make the identification 
of such an effect in the context of the enactment of the original securities regulation 
statutes challenging, including the lack of an adequate control group against which 
to study the effects of the legislation’s passage and the fact that active enforcement 
of the legislation took place well after its passage.180 
Analysis of the impact of imposing FPDRs on a new group of firms as a result 
of the 1964 Amendments, on the other hand, supports the hypothesis that imposing 
FPDRs can increase a firm’s share price and, therefore, provides evidence that in 
the absence of mandatory disclosure regulation at least some firms will adopt 
value-reducing, opaque disclosure policies.181 Michael Greenstone and his 
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disclosure of firm information. But this potential offsetting cost of more disclosure is 
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colleagues (the “Greenstone study”) measured the effects of the 1964 Amendments 
on the share prices of the affected firms in several ways.182 An event study of the 
share prices of the affected firms at the time of the announcement and passage of 
the 1964 Amendments found evidence of a 3.5% positive abnormal return 
surrounding these events.183 They also found that the affected firms experienced 
abnormal positive returns of between 11.5% and 22.1% in the period between the 
announcement of the legislation and the legislation fully going into effect, 
suggesting that actual gains were even greater than those initially anticipated by 
investors.184 
Another potential source of evidence that those who control a firm’s disclosure 
policy may adopt suboptimal disclosure policies to facilitate self-dealing comes 
from research on why firms exit the federal periodic disclosure regime.185 Christian 
Leuz and his colleagues collected information on firms in the United States that 
elected to deregister and cease their obligations to comply with FPDRs between 
1998 and 2004.186 Leuz and his colleagues concluded from their study that “agency 
problems and insiders’ interests play into the decision to go dark.”187 Several 
                                                                                                                 
presumed to exist based on their assumption that the market failure addressed by disclosure 
regulation involves the absence of adequate private contracting mechanisms. To support this 
interpretation of their results Greenstone et al. cite the analytic model developed by Shleifer 
& Wolfenzon, supra note 173, but that model is not particularly germane to the United 
States capital markets, where mechanisms to ensure the enforceability of private contracts 
are comparatively robust. Therefore, a rise in share price probably reflects net gains in firm 
value from imposing FPDRs, rather than just gross gains (before adjusting for insider losses) 
as suggested by Greenstone et al. 
  182. Greenstone et al., supra note 181. Similar findings based on a smaller sample of the 
affected securities are reported in Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: 
Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (2007). But see Robert 
Battalio, Brian Hatch & Tim Loughran, Who Benefited from the Disclosure Mandates of the 
1964 Securities Acts Amendments?, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1047 (2011). There are, however, 
significant problems with the Battalio et al. analysis. In his written testimony before the 
Senate in December of 2011, Coates identified many of shortcomings in the Battalio study. 
Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising, supra note 127, at 24–25 n.2 (statement of 
Professor John C. Coates IV, Harvard Law School). Most problematically, the main findings 
of the Battalio et al. analysis appear to be premised on the incorrect assumption that failing 
to reject their null hypothesis of no benefit from the 1964 Amendments supports the null 
hypothesis that there is no such relationship. 
 183. Greenstone et al., supra note 181, at 426–39. 
 184. Id. at 439–43. 
 185. A possible link between periodic disclosure and reduced self-dealing is also 
suggested by inter-country comparisons of securities markets. See, e.g., Luzi Hail & 
Christian Leuz, International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal 
Institutions and Securities Regulations Matter?, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 485 (2006); Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal 
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997). However, there are number of 
confounding factors that make the inference less certain in the inter-country context than in 
the intra-country context. 
 186. Christian Leuz, Alexander Triantis & Tracy Yue Wang, Why Do Firms Go Dark? 
Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations, 45 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 181 (2008). 
 187. Id. at 183. 
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findings in the study supported their conclusion about the link between increased 
amounts of self-dealing and the decision to stop complying with FPDRs. First, 
Leuz and his colleagues found that firms with weaker corporate governance (as 
indicated by fewer outside directors) and less outside monitoring (as measured by 
the absence of institutional investors) are more likely to deregister.188 This finding 
suggests that firms at which the opportunities for self-dealing are greater in the 
absence of compliance with FPDRs (because there are fewer other ways to protect 
outside investors) are the firms that are more likely to deregister. Second, they 
found that the relationship noted above among corporate governance, outside 
monitoring, and the propensity of a firm to deregister is accentuated for firms that 
generate more free cash flow.189 The greater a firm’s free cash flow, the more 
valuable the opportunities to self-deal are, and so incentives to end compliance with 
FPDRs are even greater. Third, outside investors have a more negative reaction, as 
indicated by a decline in share price, when firms that otherwise provide less 
protection to outside investors choose to deregister.190 If the value of self-dealing is 
increased by avoiding compliance with FPDRs, then, presumably, compliance with 
FPDRs reduces net private gains from self-dealing. 
Measurable benefits from the imposition of disclosure regulation, as evidenced 
by the findings reported by the Greenstone study and indirectly by the findings 
reported by Leuz and his colleagues, indicate that one justification for periodic 
disclosure regulation is that such regulations can reduce inefficient levels of self-
dealing. This reduction in self-dealing from periodic disclosure regulation is also a 
justification for the compulsory imposition of FPDRs on certain firms. Insiders who 
would choose suboptimal disclosure policies in the absence of compelled 
disclosure will certainly not voluntarily elect to comply with FPDRs, even when 
complying with such requirements could increase the overall value of the firm. 
However, because the precise mechanisms by which agents manage to avoid 
bearing the full costs of entering into self-dealing transactions with the firm are 
unclear, it will be difficult to identify the specific firms affected by this market 
failure. 
C. Regulating Periodic Disclosure as a Redress for Positive Interfirm Externalities 
A third justification for requiring firms to make periodic disclosures arises from 
the distortions in firm periodic disclosure policies caused by positive interfirm 
externalities. Positive interfirm externalities will lead firms to systematically 
disclose less than a socially optimal amount of information in the absence of 
regulatory intervention. These distortions result from a “two-audience problem.”191 
Public firm disclosures are available to both the intended audience for the firm’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188. Id. at 193 tbl.5 (Models 4, 5, 6, and 7), 195. These findings are consistent with 
Barzuza’s findings with respect to the types of firms that tend to incorporate in Nevada. 
Barzuza, supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text. 
 189. Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 193 tbl.5 (Models 6 and 7). 
 190. Id. at 201 tbl.10 (Model 4). 
 191. I borrow the term “two-audience problem” from Joan Farre-Mensa, Why Are Most 
Firms Privately Held? (Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719204. 
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disclosure, the firm’s investors, and an unwanted “second” audience, the firm’s 
competitors.192 
The magnitude of the distortions in a firm’s disclosure policies caused by this 
“two-audience problem” can be observed in several ways. First, the distorting 
effects of positive interfirm externalities are evident when disclosure practices in 
private financing transactions are compared with disclosure practices in otherwise 
similar public transactions. Substantially less information is disclosed between 
parties when details are made public, as compared with when the parties to the 
transaction can strictly restrict third-party access to the disclosed information.193 
Evidence of the significance of the distortions in disclosure policies and firm 
behavior caused by interfirm externalities is also provided by research on 
operational differences between public firms and comparable private firms.194 
Finally, the effects of firms’ concerns about disclosing competitively 
disadvantaging information is evident in the tendency of firms in more competitive 
industries to request that more of the information they file with the SEC be 
redacted before public distribution.195  
The implications of distortions caused by positive interfirm externalities for the 
efficacy of requiring firms to comply with FPDRs are more difficult to evaluate. 
Financial economists are equivocal about whether positive interfirm externalities 
justify disclosure regulation.196 Legal scholarship on the ramifications of interfirm 
externalities for securities regulation is also conflicted.197 For reasons I have 
elaborated elsewhere, my conclusion is that positive interfirm externalities do 
provide a sound justification for regulating a firm’s periodic disclosure practices.198 
Without regulatory intervention firms will systematically under disclose, and 
systemic under disclosure can be harmful both because of the increased likelihood 
of negative spillover effects from under disclosure and because such under 
disclosure can exacerbate self-dealing costs. 
If positive interfirm externalities justify the regulation of periodic disclosures, 
then the argument for making compliance with FPDRs compulsory to realize these 
benefits is straightforward. A large element of coordination is necessary to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 192. Id. at 1. 
 193. Guttentag, Imposing Disclosure Requirements, supra note 144, at 149–53. 
 194. Asker et al., supra note 152 and accompanying text, note one such difference, 
although there may be other causes for the differences they observe than distortions caused 
by positive interfirm externalities. 
 195. Robert E. Verrecchia & Joseph Weber, Redacted Disclosure, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 791 
(2006).  
 196. Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure 
Regulation and Externalities, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 479 (2000); Ronald A. Dye, Mandatory 
Versus Voluntary Disclosures: The Cases of Financial and Real Externalities, 65 ACCT. 
REV. 1 (1990).  
 197. Merritt Fox and Roberta Romano had a lively debate as to whether the presence of 
positive interfirm externalities provides a sufficient justification for periodic disclosure 
regulation. Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563 
(2001); Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure, supra note 144; Romano, 
Empowering Investors, supra note 179; Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 179. 
 198. See Guttentag, Imposing Disclosure Requirements, supra note 144; Guttentag, 
Accuracy Enhancement, supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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implement a system that increases firm disclosures sufficiently to correct for 
positive interfirm externalities. Any individual firm would prefer to remain silent 
while letting all other firms provide the additional competitively valuable 
information necessary to address this market failure. Therefore, firms are unlikely 
to voluntarily elect to participate in a mandatory disclosure regime designed to 
provide a redress for positive interfirm externalities, even when the overall effects 
of increasing disclosure as a redress for this market failure are quite positive. 
There are, however, aspects of the positive interfirm externalities justification 
for requiring periodic disclosures that present special challenges when this 
justification for periodic disclosure regulations is relied upon to inform policy 
decisions about which firms should be required to comply with FPDRs. First, it is 
difficult to directly measure the benefits of providing a redress for this market 
failure. The gains from disclosure regulation aimed at correcting for positive 
interfirm externalities do not flow immediately and directly to the firm being 
required to make the additional disclosures. Therefore, these gains cannot be 
measured in the same way that, for example, the reduction in inefficient levels of 
self-dealing was measured by the Greenstone study.199 
A second challenge in determining which firms should be required to comply 
with FPDRs in order to correct for positive interfirm externalities is that the social 
costs from the under disclosure that can result from positive interfirm externalities 
are only produced in conjunction with another market failure. Even if firms 
systematically disclose less than the socially optimal amount of information 
because of positive interfirm externalities, such under disclosure need not cause 
social harms. Rather, the resulting under disclosure will only generate social costs 
when, for example, the resulting under disclosure increases agency costs as firms 
adopt disclosure policies that simultaneously reduce the release of competitively 
disadvantaging information and facilitate self-dealing.200 
To identify firms that will benefit from periodic disclosure regulation as a way 
to redress positive interfirm externalities, it is necessary to consider not only 
distortions in disclosure policies caused by concerns about disclosing competitively 
disadvantaging information, but also whether the firm will cause negative spillover 
effects or suffer from increased self-dealing costs as a consequence of the systemic 
under disclosure caused by positive interfirm externalities. 
D. Other Common Rationales for Disclosure Regulation  
The three justifications for a compulsory mandatory disclosure regime discussed 
above do not exhaust the list of reasons why periodic disclosure requirements 
might be imposed on a firm. In this Section, I briefly review four additional 
arguments that have been offered to justify the regulation of firm disclosures and 
explain why I choose not to rely on these arguments to inform the analysis of when 
certain firms should be required to make periodic disclosures. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 199. Greenstone et al., supra note 181. 
 200. See Guttentag, Accuracy Enhancement, supra note 145 (providing an analytic model 
formalizing this observation).  
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The four justifications briefly reviewed below are: (1) requiring periodic 
disclosure requirements offer firms a way to make a credible commitment to 
ongoing, accurate, and timely disclosures; (2) government supervision of the 
regulation of periodic disclosures provides firms a way to inexpensively access 
public enforcement of their disclosure commitments; (3) the regulation of periodic 
disclosures helps to ensure that investments in the production of information about 
public firms are made at a more efficient level; and (4) periodic disclosure 
regulation provides a way to limit harms to society that might be caused by the 
otherwise unfettered actions of large firms. 
With respect to justifications based on the ways in which disclosure regulation 
can provide firms a means to make their disclosure commitments more credible, 
scholars, including John Coffee, Joseph Franco, and Edward Rock, have noted that 
a firm’s disclosure commitments will be more credible if the firm can commit to a 
mandatory disclosure regime from which exit is costly.201 Rock uses the apt 
metaphor of a lobster trap to describe how such a mechanism works best. The 
lobster trap is easy for the lobster to enter but difficult for the lobster to exit. Rock 
observes that the mandatory disclosure regime in the United States has such a 
design: once a company begins to comply with FPDRs in the United States, it is 
quite difficult for the company to exit the mandatory disclosure system.202  
Evidence that periodic disclosure regulation can provide this credible 
commitment benefit can be gleaned from several sources. First, research findings of 
gains realized by firms which elect to cross-list their securities in a regime with 
more robust securities regulations suggests that mandatory disclosure regulation 
provides value as a credible commitment device.203 Securities prices are higher, and 
the cost of capital is lower for otherwise comparable firms, when a firm’s securities 
are cross-listed on a securities exchange with a higher level of mandatory 
disclosure.204 
Another source of evidence of the credible commitment value of a mandatory 
disclosure regime is provided by research on the effects when barriers to exit from 
a mandatory disclosure regime are lowered. Fernandes and his colleagues studied 
the effects of lowering barriers to exit when the SEC modified Rule 12h-6 in 2007 
                                                                                                                 
 
 201. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence 
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 691–92 (1999); 
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 202. Rock, supra note 201, at 677–84. 
 203. For a discussion of the relationship between cross-listing and competition between 
market centers, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Toward the Top?: The Impact of Cross-
Listing and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1757, 1770–76 (2002). 
 204. Evangelos Benos & Michael S. Weisbach, Private Benefits and Cross-Listings in the 
United States, 5 EMERGING MARKETS REV. 217 (2004). There are, however, limitations in 
concluding that the benefits from cross-listing arise solely from the effects of making the 
commitments to future disclosures more credible. Cross-listing can also signal a firm’s 
quality and provide the firm access to a larger pool of capital. 
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to make it easier for foreign firms complying with FPDRs to end their reporting 
obligations in the United States.205 They found that the share prices of firms 
“located in countries with poor disclosure environments” declined as a result of the 
adoption of this rule.206 If increasing the ease with which firms can exit from a 
mandatory disclosure regime can lower a firm’s value, then, presumably, a 
mandatory disclosure regime can increase firm value by making exit more 
expensive. 
The benefit a mandatory disclosure regime can provide by offering firms a way 
to make a credible commitment to periodic disclosures is not included in the 
analysis below of when to require firms to comply with FPDRs because this 
credible commitment benefit can be realized without compelling participation. 
Unlike lobsters, firms presumably can make an informed and welfare-maximizing 
decision as to whether to enter into a mandatory disclosure regime that is difficult 
to exit. 
A second benefit from mandatory disclosure regulation, which is related to the 
credible commitment benefit, arises from the fact that mandatory disclosure 
requirements are often enforced, at least to some degree, by a public entity. 
Publicly enforced mandatory disclosure requirements can benefit investors by 
providing a relatively simple way to gain access to public enforcement of their 
disclosure commitments.207 There are two ways in which public enforcement of 
periodic disclosure requirements might benefit investors. First, public enforcement 
may be more efficient than private enforcement because of various economies of 
scale in enforcement technologies.208 Second, in a legal environment where the 
private enforcement of contracts is difficult or expensive, public enforcement can 
                                                                                                                 
 
 205. Prior to the amendment of Rule 12h-6 in 2007 foreign firms were only able to 
deregister a class of securities if they met the test established in Rule 12h-6 for 
deregistration. Rule 12h-6 had only allowed deregistration if a firm had: (1) fewer than 300 
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Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation: Hysteresis, Implementation, and 
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in which public enforcement is superior to private enforcement, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 45, 46 (2000). 
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provide a more reliable way for firms to make their commitment to periodic 
disclosures credible. 
But, as with the credible commitment justification for disclosure regulation, the 
benefits a mandatory disclosure regime might provide by facilitating access to 
public enforcement can be realized without requiring firms to comply with FPDRs. 
In the absence of other market failures, the decision of whether to participate in a 
mandatory disclosure regime in order to access public enforcement of a firm’s 
disclosure commitments is best left to the firm. 
A third argument for mandatory disclosure regulation identified by scholars, but 
not included in the analysis here, is that, in the absence of such regulation, 
information about the firm will either be underproduced or overproduced. The 
argument that disclosure regulation is useful in deterring either the underproduction 
or overproduction of information about the firm has a distinguished pedigree and 
continues to be cited in securities regulation textbooks.209 According to this 
argument, information about the firm might be underproduced because such 
information is a public good, which investors can gain access to regardless of 
whether they have purchased the firm’s securities.210 Public goods are typically 
underproduced without regulatory intervention.211 Conversely, information about 
the firm may be overproduced from a social welfare perspective to the extent 
investors expend resources to gain informational advantages over other investors 
without benefitting the productive economy.212 
While concerns about market failures in the production of information about the 
firm are theoretically sound, it is unclear, in practice, how a regulator could 
calculate whether too much or too little information is produced as a result of these 
two potential market failures, which point in opposite directions.213 Similarly, it is 
difficult to specify how this market failure should be used to determine which firms 
should be subject to mandatory periodic disclosure obligations, given uncertainty 
about the direction and magnitude of these market failures.214 Because of these 
practical difficulties and uncertainties, I choose to exclude market failures in the 
production of information about the firm from the list of justifications used to 
determine which firms should be required to comply with FPDRs. 
A fourth argument for mandatory disclosure regulation identified by other 
scholars, but not included in the analysis here, is that disclosure regulation can help 
to mitigate the harms to society that might otherwise be caused by large, 
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unregulated firms. Cynthia Williams has shown that part of the motivation for the 
original passage of securities regulation legislation in the 1930s was concern about 
the harms to society that large firms might cause and the hope that requiring 
periodic disclosures could “inculcate a greater sense of public accountability into 
corporate management.”215 Williams goes on to argue that the historical roots of 
securities regulation as a means to promote corporate social transparency justify 
including provisions in mandatory disclosure requirements that facilitate public 
discourse about the impacts on society of corporate activities.216 One could argue 
that this justification for federal securities regulation could also be used to inform 
the determination of which firms should be required to comply with FPDRs. 
Following such an approach, the potential social harms that a particular firm might 
cause would be one criteria for determining whether the firm should be required to 
comply with FPDRs. 
More recently, Langevoort and Thompson have similarly observed that “some 
portion of what we call securities regulation is really an instinct about the 
accountability of large, economically powerful institutions that is only loosely 
coupled with orthodox notions of investor protection.”217 Langevoort and 
Thompson go on to argue benefits to society from the greater transparency that 
flow from mandatory disclosure regulation could inform the determination of 
which firms should be subject to the mandatory disclosure regime. Their specific 
recommendation is that only firms with a “large public footprint” should be 
required to comply with those aspects of the mandatory disclosure regime that are 
aimed at achieving these broader purposes of affecting the behavior of large public 
firms. 218 Langevoort and Thompson, therefore, propose that benefits to society 
from the greater transparency that flows from mandatory disclosure regulation 
should inform the determination of which firms should be subject to the mandatory 
disclosure regime. 219 
Mandatory disclosure regulation may cabin the power and influence of large 
firms. However, both the types of information disclosed to achieve these larger 
societal purposes and the criteria for establishing the relevant firms to be subject to 
these disclosure requirements do not align well with the other criteria relevant to 
determining which firms should be required to comply with FPDRs discussed 
above.220 A better solution to address the relationship between disclosure rules and 
these larger societal objectives would be to treat these objectives and the 
information required to be disclosed to ameliorate these problems as providing the 
basis for an alternative disclosure scheme.221 For example, concerns about the 
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political influence of corporations would be more effectively addressed by 
requiring firms to disclose political contributions above a given dollar amount 
rather than by linking such a disclosure obligation to whether a firm is otherwise 
required to comply with FPDRs.222 Because of the mismatch between the other 
purposes served by requiring compliance with FPDRs, which are tied to the 
financial well-being of the firm and the capital markets, and the goal of 
constraining the social influence of large firms, considerations of how disclosure 
regulation can curb the influence on society of certain firms are excluded from the 
list of justifications used to determine which firms should be required to comply 
with FPDRs. 
This completes the discussion of the justifications for the regulation of a firm’s 
periodic disclosure policies. Three related justifications are shown to provide a 
sound basis for determining which firms must comply with FPDRs. Other 
arguments identifying potential benefits provided by mandatory disclosure 
regulation are not helpful in determining which firms should be required to comply 
with FPDRs. 
III. WHICH FIRMS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO MAKE PERIODIC DISCLOSURES 
This Part of the Article builds on the historical review and economic analysis 
provided above to generate specific recommendations as to how and why to rewrite 
the rules used to determine which firms must comply with FPDRs in the United 
States. 
A. Restructuring the Rules Determining Which Firms Are Required to Make 
Periodic Disclosures  
My first recommendation about how to rewrite the rules used to determine 
which firms must comply with FPDRs has to do with how best to structure these 
rules. The structure of the rules currently used to determine which firms must 
comply with FPDRs is not sufficiently flexible to address important differences 
between firms. The current system should be redesigned to separate firms into one 
of the following three categories with respect to periodic disclosure obligations: (1) 
firms that receive an automatic exemption from compliance with FPDRs (an 
existing category), (2) firms that receive a contingent exemption from compliance 
with FPDRs (a new category), and (3) firms that are required to comply with 
FPDRs (an existing category). 
The historical review in Part I of this Article illuminated the extent to which the 
rules currently used to determine which firms must comply with FPDRs were 
shaped by political pressure from firms already providing high-quality disclosures 
to establish a level playing field among otherwise comparable firms. One 
consequence of this history is that policy in this area is based on the premise that 
firms should be forced to comply with FPDRs, if they are otherwise similar to firms 
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already complying with FPDRs. The most comprehensive consideration to date of 
the rules used to determine which firms must comply with FPDRs, the Special 
Study commissioned by Congress that preceded the 1964 Amendments, took for 
granted the premise that comparable firms should be subject to similar disclosure 
obligations.223 
Starting from the premise that a level regulatory playing field needs to be 
maintained naturally leads to a system in which there are only two categories of 
firms with respect to mandatory compliance with FPDRs. One group of firms, 
those that resemble firms that are already making high-quality disclosures, is 
required to make comparable periodic disclosures. The other group of firms, which 
do not resemble firms already making high-quality disclosures, is free to do as it 
pleases with respect to periodic disclosure policies.  
There are, however, two problems with using similarities between firms as the 
criteria for determining which firms must comply with FPDRs. First, such an 
approach is static and, therefore, requires finding a measure of firm comparability 
that is reliable and not easily manipulated. The shareholders of record criteria, 
which has been used both before and after the passage of the JOBS Act, is 
particularly problematic in this regard. Shareholders of record is an increasingly 
indirect and easy to manipulate measure of the number of a firm’s beneficial 
owners.224 
Other measures, such as the firm’s market capitalization or the trading volume 
of a firm’s securities, would be more difficult to manipulate than the shareholders 
of record criteria. Both of these alternatives were considered when the Special 
Study recommendations about what criteria to use to trigger mandatory compliance 
with FPDRs were originally made225 and have recently sparked renewed interest.226 
Switching to a less easily manipulated measure of firm comparability would be a 
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a716e166e309 (“The real problem is that the ‘shareholder of record’ concept is archaic and 
can be gamed.”). 
 225. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 226. Sjostrom has argued for use the volume of trading in a firm’s securities as a metric. 
Sjostrom, supra note 9. This is an idea that Langevoort and Thompson have also endorsed. 
Supra note 8, at 26–27. In his testimony before Congress, Coffee recommended switching to 
a trigger based on the value of a firm’s “public float.” Spurring Job Growth Through Capital 
Formation While Protecting Investors, supra note 224, at 28 (statement of Professor John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Columbia University Law School); see also infra note 236. 
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partial solution to the problem of using a static measure to determine when firms 
are comparable enough to trigger mandatory disclosure requirements.227 
There is, however, a more intractable problem with using similarities between 
firms as the basis for determining which firms must comply with FPDRs. The 
efficacy of such an approach depends upon there being a fair degree of 
homogeneity among firms. If firms are similar both in terms of some observable 
metric and the costs and benefits of making periodic disclosures, then setting 
threshold levels based on a typical or average company may provide an effective 
way to develop policy. However, to the extent that there is not a high correlation 
between the observable features of various firms and the costs and benefits of 
periodic disclosures for those various firms, no criterion or set of criteria can 
provide an adequate means of distinguishing firms in a way that efficiently imposes 
periodic disclosure obligations. 
This problem of heterogeneity between firms with respect to the costs and 
benefits of periodic disclosures, even if the firms share superficial similarities, is 
likely to be significant. One could look at, for example, two firms with securities 
traded at similarly high volumes. In one case a combination of high trading volume 
and limited periodic disclosures might be associated with significant market 
failures from negative spillover effects, wasteful levels of self-dealing, and positive 
interfirm externalities. The same combination of high trading volume and limited 
periodic disclosures might not be problematic at all in a second case, perhaps 
because the trading of the securities of this second firm takes place on a specialized 
exchange open to only very sophisticated investors with substantial capital 
reserves, and the investors in this second firm are powerful and sophisticated 
enough to prevent the firm from adopting wasteful, opaque disclosure policies that 
facilitate self-dealing. For this second company there would not be a sound 
argument for requiring compliance with FPDRs, even though the firm’s shares 
were traded at the same high-volume levels as the first firm. 
In summary, the two problems endemic to the current structure of the rules 
requiring compliance with FPDRs are: (1) difficulty in identifying a reliable 
measure of firm comparability, and (2) differences between firms with respect to 
the costs and benefits of periodic disclosure policies that do not correlate with any 
observable firm characteristics. Both of these problems are evident in the threshold 
triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs in force both before and after the 
passage of the JOBS Act. 
Prior to the passage of the JOBS Act, the criteria used to determine which firms 
must comply with FPDRs were clearly both underinclusive and overinclusive. Most 
notably, there certainly were firms with more than $10 million in assets and more 
than 500 shareholders of record that, nonetheless, faced none of the market failures 
that would justify regulatory intervention in the firm’s periodic disclosure practices. 
As a hypothetical example, suppose the securities of a particular firm had been 
issued with severe restrictions on the tradability of the firm’s shares, ameliorating 
any concerns about negative spillover effects from the trading of this firm’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 227. Some of the ways in which a trigger based on the volume of trading in a firm’s 
securities could be evaded are discussed in Langevoort and Thompson, see supra note 8, at 
27. 
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shares.228 Suppose further, that the shares of this particular firm were privately 
issued to investors after balanced negotiations between the firm and a sophisticated 
representative of the collective investor interests, ameliorating concerns about the 
costs of wasteful self-dealing facilitated by opaque disclosure policies. Despite 
these obvious mitigating factors, under the rules established by the 1964 
Amendments such a firm would still be required to comply with FPDRs. 
Conversely, after the passage of the JOBS Act, it is reasonable to expect that 
many firms with fewer than 2000 shareholders of record (particularly once many 
employee shareholders are excluded from the count) will adopt periodic disclosure 
policies that impose social costs because of the various effects of those market 
failures that justify regulatory intervention into firm periodic disclosure policies.229 
The trading of the securities of firms with fewer than 2000 shareholders of record 
could easily generate negative spillover effects.230 Many firms with fewer than 
2000 shareholders of record would appear to also be of the type that might adopt 
socially wasteful, opaque disclosure policies to facilitate self-dealing. Both of these 
problems would likely be exacerbated by distortions in firm disclosure policies 
resulting from positive interfirm externalities because even firms with fewer than 
2000 shareholders of record would reasonably expect that competitors could find a 
way to access disclosures intended only for the firm’s investors. 
Moreover, these observations about the underinclusive nature of the JOBS Act 
criteria triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs probably understate the 
problem. Firms had already begun to master the art of avoiding the 500 
shareholders of record threshold.231 Given the facility with which firms can control 
the number of their shareholders of record, after the JOBS Act changes, there will 
be little impediment from firms acting as they please in terms of issuing shares 
through private offerings and facilitating tradability without concern about 
triggering an obligation to comply with FPDRs. Many of the documented gains that 
can be provided by requiring compliance with FPDRs will likely be sacrificed.232 
The limitations of a system that forces firms into only one of two categories to 
determine which firms must comply with FPDRs are evident both in past and 
current efforts to implement such a system. 
A disclosure regime in which firms are, instead, separated into three categories 
with respect to compliance with FPDRs would be more dynamic and more capable 
of addressing unobserved differences between firms with respect to the costs and 
benefits of periodic disclosures. 
The general contours of the new three-category system for determining which 
firms must comply with FPDRs would be as follows. Firms would only be granted 
                                                                                                                 
 
 228. See infra notes 276, 278 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra Part II. 
 230. The findings of negative venue-specific spillover effects reported in Bushee and 
Leuz, see supra note 156, were all produced by firms with less than 500 shareholders of 
record. 
 231. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 232. Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising, supra note 127 (statement of Professor 
John C. Coates IV, Harvard Law School); supra note 130 and accompanying text. This is 
probably why Coates considered the change in the JOBS Act of the shareholders of record 
thresholds triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs especially problematic.  
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an automatic exemption from compliance with FPDRs under circumstances when it 
is quite unlikely the harms from systematic under disclosure are significant.233 The 
calculation for determining which firms should be granted this automatic 
exemption from compliance with FPDRs using the new three-category system 
would be different from the calculation currently used to determine when to grant 
an automatic exemption. The current calculation requires estimating the point at 
which the benefits from periodic disclosure regulation exceed the costs for the 
typical or average firm. As a result of applying this new calculation, many fewer 
firms would receive an automatic exemption from mandatory compliance with 
FPDRs than is currently the case. But firms not granted an automatic exemption 
from compliance with FPDRs would now be allowed to take specified ameliorative 
measures to minimize the societal costs from persistent under disclosure, and, by 
doing so, avoid mandatory compliance with FPDRs. Crafting the appropriate 
ameliorative measures requires identifying specific ways in which the several 
market failures that otherwise justify regulating periodic disclosures can be 
mitigated. Potential ameliorative measures might involve either strict restrictions 
on the tradability of the firm’s shares or having firms commit to a viable alternative 
periodic disclosure regime. Firms that do not qualify for an automatic exemption 
and that do not take acceptable ameliorative steps would be required to comply 
with FPDRs.  
More details about how to implement the proposed new three-category system 
for determining which firms must comply with FPDRs are provided below. 
B. Criteria for Granting an Automatic Exemption from Periodic Disclosure 
Requirements 
The first step in specifying how to implement the three-category mandatory 
disclosure regime proposed in this Article is to determine the conditions under 
which firms should receive an automatic exemption from compliance with FPDRs. 
Recall that under the three-category mandatory disclosure regime an automatic 
exemption would be granted only in circumstances where the best available 
evidence suggests that none of the three legitimate justifications for imposing 
periodic disclosure requirements on a particular firm is likely to justify the costs of 
regulatory intervention. 
Two criteria that have been used in the past as a basis for granting firms an 
automatic exemption from compliance with FPDRs, firm size and the number of a 
firm’s shareholders, are reconsidered here in light of the new way of calculating 
when firms should be granted an automatic exemption from compliance with 
FPDRs. An automatic exemption from compliance with FPDRs might also be 
provided when the trading volume of a firm’s securities remains below a given 
                                                                                                                 
 
 233. Receiving this automatic exemption from mandatory compliance with FPDRs does 
not mean that these firms, or their disclosures, would or should be entirely unregulated. For 
example, other aspects of securities regulation would and probably should still apply, such as 
restrictions on insider trading. See Pollman, supra note 109, at 30–31. There might also be 
certain periodic disclosure requirements that are still appropriate for these firms that are 
somewhat lesser than traditional FPDRs, but consideration of such disclosure requirements is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
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level, but such an approach is likely to be overly restrictive and evidence is not 
readily available to estimate what such a minimal trading threshold should be.234 
Another intriguing alternative not explored further is that the age of the firm could 
be used to determine which firms are required to comply with FPDRs, a possibility 
suggested by the work of Jeff Schwartz, and indirectly endorsed as a valid criterion 
for determining periodic disclosure obligations in the definition under the JOBS 
Act of an “emerging growth company” as those firms which have offered equity 
publicly for the first time within the past five years.235 
1. Firm Size 
I first consider whether there is a specific firm size below which it would be 
appropriate to continue to grant firms an automatic exemption from compliance 
with FPDRs. I reach two conclusions about how firm size threshold levels for 
granting an automatic exemption from mandatory compliance with FPDRs should 
be changed under the three-category mandatory disclosure regime proposed in this 
Article. First, market capitalization is a better measure of firm size than asset value 
for the purposes of determining when to grant an automatic exemption from 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs.236 Second, I recommend that firms with a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 234. Sjostrom has argued for use the volume of trading in a firm’s securities as a metric, 
Sjostrom, supra note 9, as have Langevoort and Thompson, supra note 8, at 26–27. Some of 
the concerns about over-restrictiveness of using trading volume to determine which firms 
should be granted an exemption from compliance with FPDRs is suggested by the 
hypothetical example infra Part III.B.1. 
 235. Schwartz, supra note 109, at 50–75. See also Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 
8, at 53. With respect to the definition of “emerging growth company” in the JOBS Act, see 
JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101, 126 Stat. 306, 307 (2012). 
 236. Market capitalization refers to the value of the firm’s equity capital based on the 
trading value of the firm’s shares. In most cases, the market capitalization of a firm is equal 
to the price of one share of the firm’s stock times the total number of shares outstanding. 
ROBERT B. DICKIE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS AND BUSINESS VALUATION FOR THE 
PRACTICAL LAWYER 3 (2d ed. 2006).  
  A firm’s “public float,” the market value of the firm’s shares not held by firm 
affiliates or insiders, is an alternative indicator of firm size. COFFEE & SALE, supra note 142, 
at 144. Coffee has recommended using a firm’s public float as a basis for determining which 
firms are required to comply with FPDRs. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation 
While Protecting Investors, supra note 224, at 13 (statement of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Columbia University Law School). There are tradeoffs in using a firm’s public float, instead 
of its market capitalization, as a basis for triggering mandatory compliance with FPDRs. One 
of the benefits of using a measure of public float is that public float is already in use 
elsewhere in the securities regulation scheme to differentiate between large and small 
companies. See, e.g., COFFEE & SALE, supra note 142, at 144. A firm’s public float also 
provides information about the extent to which outside investors may be harmed by 
problems with the firm’s disclosure policies. Finally, determining a firm’s market 
capitalization may be difficult in a context where shares are rarely or privately traded. The 
disadvantage of public float is that, to the extent firm size is a useful indicator of the relative 
costs and benefits of periodic disclosure regulation for a typical firm, market capitalization 
provides the more direct measure of firm size. 
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market capitalization of less than $35 million be granted an automatic exemption 
from mandatory compliance with FPDRs. 
The first step in determining the appropriate firm size threshold below which to 
grant an automatic exemption from compliance with FPDRs is to consider how 
firm size interacts with each of the three legitimate justifications for requiring 
companies to comply with FPDRs (as well as with the unstated fourth assumption 
that regulatory intervention is never costless).237 In terms of direct links to the 
market failures justifying mandatory periodic disclosure regulation, firm size would 
not appear to be an especially promising criterion for determining which firms 
should be granted an automatic exemption from required compliance with FPDRs.  
There is no obvious direct connection between a firm’s size and negative 
spillover effects from the trading of the securities of firms providing investors only 
limited amounts of information. The active trading of the securities of very small 
firms, if these firms provided insufficient amounts of information to investors, 
could on a marginal basis have quite harmful impacts both on valuations at a 
particular trading venue and for the economy as a whole. Conversely, the trading of 
the securities of even a very large firm could presumably be sufficiently segregated 
from other markets and the economy as a whole to prevent the possibility of the 
types of negative spillover effects that might justify periodic disclosure regulation. 
Nor is there a self-evident link between firm size and the social costs of self-
dealing resulting from firms adopting opaque disclosure policies. Firms both large 
and small may be sufficiently well-governed so as to ensure that their disclosure 
policies maximize the value of the firm. If anything, one implication from research 
on when agency costs distort public firm policy choices in other arenas, such as the 
choice of the firm’s state of incorporation, is that smaller firms, rather than larger 
firms, would be more likely to suffer from costly self-dealing, and, therefore, 
smaller firms may be a more appropriate target for mandatory disclosure 
regulation.238 
In terms of possible links between firm size and distortions resulting from 
positive interfirm externalities, on the one hand, small firms might find it easier to 
disclose information to investors in a sufficiently confidential manner, so as to 
avoid distortions resulting from positive interfirm externalities. On the other hand, 
information that is material is more granular for a smaller firm, and, therefore, 
potentially more valuable to a firm’s competitors, meaning the risks of distortions 
to avoid competitively disadvantaging disclosures might be greater for smaller 
firms. In summary, implications from direct links between firm size and the three 
market failures that justify periodic disclosure regulation are ambiguous. 
There is, however, an important indirect link between firm size and legitimate 
justifications for requiring compliance with FPDRs, because the costs of periodic 
disclosure regulation are more likely to be fixed than the gains from periodic 
disclosure regulation, which are more likely to vary with firm size. If the gains 
from periodic disclosure regulation vary with firm size more than costs, then there 
                                                                                                                 
 
 237. The three legitimate justifications for periodic disclosure regulation are discussed in 
Part II of this Article. 
 238. See supra notes 174–78 and accompanying text. 
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will be a size below which firms are simply too small for potential gains from 
requiring compliance with FPDRs to justify the costs of compliance.239  
This hypothesis about the cost structure of a typical firm’s periodic disclosures, 
which justifies considering firm size in order to determine which firms must 
comply with FPRDs, is supported by some of the findings in the Bushee and Leuz 
study of the impacts of the 1999 OTCBB Rule.240 Bushee and Leuz analyzed how 
firms with securities traded on the OTCBB responded when they were required to 
either comply with FPDRs or move trading of their securities to a different 
venue.241 Bushee and Leuz found that the median market capitalization of firms 
that chose to comply with FPDRs rather than exit the OTCBB market (the 826 
“Newly Compliant” firms) in response to the rule change were significantly greater 
than those of the firms that made the opposite choice and exited the OTCBB rather 
than comply with FPDRs (the 2677 “Noncompliant” firms).242 The median market 
capitalization for the firms that were Newly Compliant was $34.5 million, as 
compared to $1.4 million for firms that were Noncompliant (both amounts in 2011 
dollars).243 Market capitalization was also shown by Bushee and Leuz in a 
regression to be a statistically significant indicator of how a firm would respond to 
the 1999 OTCBB Rule.244 A logical explanation for such dramatic differences in 
market capitalization between the firms that chose to remain on the OTCBB by 
complying with FPDRs and the firms that instead chose to exit the OTCBB is that 
the relative costs of complying with FPDRs are much higher for lower-valued 
firms. 
The Bushee and Leuz study of the effects of the 1999 OTCBB Rule also 
provides an opportunity to compare market capitalization and firm asset values as 
measures of firm size for the purpose of determining the relative costs and benefits 
of periodic disclosure regulation.245 Bushee and Leuz provide information about 
                                                                                                                 
 
 239. Guttentag, Accuracy Enhancement, supra note 145, at 626 (“If the costs of 
regulation do not increase in a linear manner with firm size, then perhaps this analysis does 
suggest that firm size is a valid criteria for determining which firms to regulate.”). See also 
Cox & Baucom, supra note 10, at 1845. 
 240. There is also evidence that certain aspects of FPDRs, such as the additional 
disclosure obligations required pursuant to the passage of Sarbanes Oxley Act, fell 
disproportionately on smaller firms. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance and 
U.S. Capital Market Competitiveness 24 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper 
No. 10-13, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1696303. 
 241. See Bushee & Leuz, supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 242. Id. at 243, 246. 
 243. Id. at 246–47 (Panel A). Conversion to 2011 dollars based on the changes in the 
consumer price index. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (2012), 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm. See supra note 81 concerning dollar 
conversion. 
 244. Id. at 246–47 (Panel B). 
 245. Research by Leuz and colleagues on firms that elected to deregister from 
compliance with FPDRs between 1998 and 2004 is also suggestive of the usefulness of 
market capitalization, as compared to asset value as a measure of the relative costs and 
benefits of periodic disclosure regulation. Leuz et al., supra note 186. The median market 
capitalization of firms that chose to “go dark” was $5.1 million and the median book value 
of this group was $20.9 million, whereas the median market capitalization was $74.4 million 
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both the market capitalization and asset values for the cohorts of firms affected by 
the 1999 OTCBB Rule. The median asset values of the Newly Compliant firms and 
the Noncompliant firms were almost identical ($1.4 million for the Newly 
Compliant firms, as compared to $1.5 million for the Noncompliant firms, in 2011 
dollars).246 Yet, as noted above, the median market capitalizations of these two 
groups of firms were dramatically different ($34.5 million for the Newly Compliant 
firms, as compared to $1.4 million for the Noncompliant firms).247 Differences in 
market capitalization proved to be a much better indicator than asset value of a 
firm’s choice of whether to comply with FPDRs, suggesting that market 
capitalization is a much better indicator than asset value of a firm’s private costs 
and benefits of complying with FPDRs. 
Findings of the effects of the 1964 Amendments in the Greenstone study and of 
the 1999 OTCBB Rule by Bushee and Leuz also provide guidance as to a specific 
minimum size threshold below which firms could reasonably be granted an 
automatic exemption from mandatory compliance with FPDRs under the three-
category mandatory disclosure regime proposed in this Article. Recall that the 
Greenstone study found that, on average, the imposition of the 1964 Amendments 
increased the share prices of the firms required to comply with FPDRs, because of 
the new law.248 The Greenstone study provided information about the market 
capitalizations and asset values of the firms studied. Particularly relevant to the 
question of whether there is a minimum size below which mandatory compliance 
with FPDRs would be inefficient were findings with respect to the group of 240 
firms that were not subject to any federal disclosure regulation prior to the 
enactment of the 1964 Amendments, but that, after the passage of the 1964 
Amendments, were required to comply with FPDRs. The median market 
capitalization reported by the Greenstone study of these “Newly Compliant” firms 
was $68 million (in 2011 dollars).249 
This information provided by the Greenstone study suggests one size threshold 
below which firms could reasonably be granted an automatic exemption from 
compliance with FPDRs. A market capitalization of $68 million could be used to 
specify the size below which firms might be granted an automatic exemption from 
a requirement to comply with FPDRs, because this is the median size of the firms 
that Greenstone and his colleagues found earned a positive abnormal return when 
required to comply with FPDRs. 
There are several reasons, however, to suspect that the median size of the Newly 
Compliant firms reported by the Greenstone study provides too high an estimate of 
the size below which firms should be granted an automatic exemption from 
compliance with FPDRs. First, the Newly Compliant firms Greenstone and his 
colleagues reported on earned a significantly positive return from regulatory 
                                                                                                                 
and the median asset value was $71.4 million of the control sample (all amounts in 2011 
dollars). For firms that chose to “go dark,” market capitalization rather than asset value is 
more suggestive of the costs and benefits of complying with FPDRs. 
 246. Bushee & Leuz, supra note 156 at 245–46. For conversion, see CPI Inflation 
Calculator, supra note 243. 
 247. See Bushee & Leuz, supra note 156, at 245–46. For conversion, see CPI Inflation 
Calculator, supra note 243. 
 248. Greenstone et al., supra note 181. 
 249. Id. at 420. For conversion, see CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 243. 
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intervention. The share price of a Newly Compliant firm increased, on average, 
between 11% and 22% as a result of compliance with FPDRs.250 These gains 
suggest that the firm for which the marginal benefit of compliance with FPDRs was 
zero would be smaller than the size of the median Newly Compliant firm. Second, 
the Greenstone study’s analysis is only designed to measure gains from one of the 
three potential sources of benefit from requiring compliance with FPDRs. Benefits 
from requiring compliance with FPDRs in order to reduce negative spillover effects 
and from providing redress for positive interfirm externalities will not show up in 
the Greenstone study measures of the share price effects on a particular group of 
firms when those firms are required to comply with FPDRs. 
Third, the amounts the Greenstone study reported are median values. Median 
values need not be the same as the level at which the marginal benefit from 
regulatory intervention equals the marginal cost, and, further, under the three-
category mandatory disclosure regime proposed in this Article, firms should only 
be granted an automatic exemption from compliance with FPDRs when the risks of 
social harms from under disclosure are quite low.251 Much has changed in securities 
markets and securities regulation since the 1964 Amendments were enacted, posing 
yet another concern with extrapolating a minimum size below which firms may be 
granted an automatic exemption from compliance with FPDRs from the work of 
the Greenstone study. On the one hand, information is significantly less expensive 
to produce and cheaper to distribute than it was when the 1964 Amendments were 
enacted.252 Provisions are also now in place that are specifically designed to lessen 
the disclosure burden of FPDRs on smaller firms.253 On the other hand, the amount 
of information required to be disclosed has steadily increased, which would suggest 
that the costs of imposing periodic disclosure requirements has increased since 
1964, presenting an argument for expanding the scope of the automatic exemption 
beyond what might have been efficient in 1964.254  
                                                                                                                 
 
 250. Greenstone et al., supra note 181, at 399. 
 251. It is generally difficult to derive complete information about a distribution from a 
single point estimate, such as a median value. A more detailed analysis of the Greenstone et 
al. data in which firms are segregated into different size cohorts similar to that provided in 
Ferrell would be informative. See Ferrell, supra note 182, at 233–34 tbls. 4 & 5, 241. With 
respect to how to determine which firms should receive an automatic exemption, see supra 
note 233 and accompanying text. 
 252. For a prescient article on these developments, see Donald C. Langevoort, 
Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 
(1985). 
 253. The current rules for reduced disclosure obligations of smaller companies are 
contained in Smaller Reporting Company Regulatory Relief and Simplification, SEC 
Release No. 33-8876, 17 C.F.R. 210 (Jan. 4, 2008) (these rules are available for firms with 
less than $75 million in public equity float, or, for companies without a calculable public 
equity float, if their revenues were below $50 million in the previous year). For a discussion 
of efforts to reduce the disclosure burdens on smaller firms, see Schwartz, supra note 109, at 
35–36. 
 254. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 
BROOK. L. REV. 763, 788–815 (1995) (describing the additional segment reporting 
requirements and management discussion and analysis requirements implemented since 
1964). 
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The Bushee and Leuz study of the impact of 1999 OTCBB Rule offers another 
data point with which to estimate the appropriate minimum size below which firms 
should be granted an automatic exemption from compliance with FPDRs under the 
three-category mandatory disclosure regime proposed in this Article.255 The 
regulatory change Bushee and Leuz analyze is both more recent and involved a 
larger number of firms than the Greenstone study (approximately 3500 firms were 
directly affected by the 1999 OTCBB Rule that Bushee and Leuz study, as 
compared with about 1000 firms directly affected by the 1964 Amendments in the 
study by Greenstone and his colleagues).256 
Bushee and Leuz in their study of the effects on share prices of the firms 
affected by the 1999 OTCBB Rule found that the effect on the share prices of the 
decision of the Newly Compliant firms to comply with FPDRs was not different 
from zero at a statistically significant level.257 To the extent an inference can be 
drawn from this null finding, it appears that share prices of Newly Compliant firms 
benefited from their decision to comply with FPDRs (perhaps by reductions in self-
dealing opportunities and perhaps by continued access to the now more valuable 
OTCBB venue) to a sufficient degree to offset the anticipated incremental new 
costs of complying with FPDRs.258 Recall that the median market capitalization of 
the Newly Compliant firms was $34.5 million (in 2011 dollars).259 Thus, for firms 
with a market capitalization of $34.5 million, the costs and benefits from the firm’s 
private perspective of complying with FPDRs might be roughly comparable (and, 
again, median values provide only an imprecise indication of what the experience 
of the marginal firm would be). Because this calculation does not include the other 
benefits of requiring compliance with FPDRs, such as those from providing redress 
from distortions caused by economy-wide negative spillover effects or positive 
interfirm externalities, these size levels are conservative (high) estimates of the 
optimal level below which an automatic exemption from mandatory compliance 
with FPDRs might be efficiently granted. 
Putting together these inferences from the findings in the Greenstone study and 
the Bushee and Leuz study suggests that firms with a market capitalization below 
$35 million could reasonably be granted an automatic exemption from compliance 
with FPDRs on the basis of their size alone under the three-category mandatory 
disclosure regime proposed in this Article. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 255. Bushee & Leuz, supra note 156. 
 256. Id. at 244; Greenstone et al., supra note 181, at 420. 
 257. Bushee & Leuz, supra note 156, at 250. This contrasts with findings of a statistically 
significant positive effect on share price from the rule’s implementation for firms with shares 
listed on the OTCBB that were already complying with FPDRs. This also contrasts with a 
statistically significant negative effect on share price for those Noncompliant firms that 
chose to exit the OTCBB. Id. at 261. 
 258. Among the challenges in reaching a conclusion from this null finding is that there 
may be some selection effects leading firms to choose to comply with FPDRs for reasons 
correlated with, but independent of, firm size. 
 259. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
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2. Number of Shareholders 
The number of a firm’s shareholders, as suggested by the number of a firm’s 
shareholders of record, had been, until the passage of the JOBS Act, a crucial 
determinant of whether a firm would be required to comply with FPDRs.260 It was 
the likelihood of crossing this threshold level of shareholders of record that led 
Facebook, Google, and Microsoft to go public.261 The use of shareholders of record 
as a proxy for the number of a firm’s beneficial owners is clearly problematic.262 
But, more generally, it is unclear why the number of a firm’s shareholders, no 
matter how this number is measured, should play a crucial role in determining 
which firms are required to comply with FPDRs, other than the fact that the number 
of a firm’s shareholders has an intuitive appeal as a metric of the extent to which a 
firm is public.263 
The framework developed in this Article provides new tools helpful in 
determining when the number of a firm’s shareholders should trigger mandatory 
compliance with FPDRs. Two of the three legitimate justifications for requiring 
compliance with FPDRs, the possibility that firms will adopt opaque disclosure 
policies to facilitate wasteful self-dealing and that distortions in disclosure policies 
caused by positive interfirm externalities, increase as the number of the firms 
shareholders increases. Consideration of these potential market failures can be used 
to generate specific guidance as to what extent the number of a firm’s shareholders 
should be used to determine which firms are granted an automatic exemption from 
compliance with FPDRs.  
First, the larger the number of a firm’s shareholders, the more difficult it will be 
to solve the various collective action problems that may contribute to a situation 
where insiders can benefit from adopting opaque disclosure policies.264 To the 
extent that wasteful levels of self-dealing are enabled by collective action problems 
faced by investors, the relevant issue is the number of investors at which collective 
action problems become significant.265 There is no research directly on point, but 
related research suggests that collective action challenges would certainly be a 
problem with group sizes in excess of fifty or one hundred members.266 
                                                                                                                 
 
 260. See supra notes 109–111 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 263. Recall that the first proposal for determining which firms should be required to 
comply with FPDRs suggested by William O. Douglas in 1938 used only a firm’s size as the 
triggering criterion. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 264. If there are many shareholders, at least some investors will be tempted to free-ride 
on the efforts of other investors to improve the firm. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver 
D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 
BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980). 
 265. For a general discussion of the relationship between group size and collective action 
problems, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS (1975). 
 266. The relevance of this relationship between group size and collective action problems 
is complicated by the fact that there must be other market failures involved as well that allow 
insiders to profit by adopting opaque disclosure policies that facilitate self-dealing. Even in 
the face of collective action problems, markets should penalize, not reward, insiders who 
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The likelihood that a firm’s disclosure policies will be distorted by positive 
interfirm externalities also increases as the number of shareholders entitled to 
receive the firm’s disclosures increases, because the only way to avoid distortions 
from positive interfirm externalities is to assure the firm that disclosed information 
will be made available only to the firm’s investors, and not the firm’s competitors. 
Such an assurance is easier to provide if the number of shareholders is small. One 
can make an educated guess about the group size at which concerns about revealing 
competitively disadvantaging information will distort a firm’s disclosures, even if 
the science on when a group becomes sufficiently large that a reasonable 
expectation of confidentiality disappears is imperfect. One suggestive finding is 
evidence of the concerns firms have about disclosing confidential information to 
their own investment bankers. John Asker and Alexander Ljungqvist find that firms 
will avoid using the same investment bank as other firms in their industry “in order 
to avoid commercially sensitive information leaking to rival firms.”267 The effects 
of this reluctance can be observed, despite both legal and business considerations 
that discourage investment banks from sharing information with the firm’s 
competitors. It would appear to be very unlikely that a firm could distribute 
information to more than one hundred ultimate investors without entertaining 
serious concern that this information would eventually become available to the 
firm’s competitors.  
Both in attempting to assure that a firm’s disclosure policies limit self-dealing 
opportunities and that distortions from positive interfirm externalities are minimal, 
the appropriate threshold level below which to grant an automatic exemption from 
required compliance with FPDRs is probably, at most, one hundred beneficial 
shareholders.268  
To summarize, under the three-category mandatory disclosure regime proposed 
in this Article, firms should be granted an automatic exemption from compliance 
with FPDRs if either their market capitalization is below $35 million or if they 
have fewer than one hundred beneficial shareholders. For firms of a larger size or 
with a greater number of shareholders, the best available evidence suggests the 
costs of complying with FPDRs are unlikely, on average, to exceed the many 
benefits of requiring compliance with FPDRs. Therefore, these levels are 
conservative (high) measures of when firms should be granted an automatic 
                                                                                                                 
select suboptimal disclosure policies. The precise link between the number of shareholders 
and firm disclosure policies that do not unduly facilitate self-dealing remains open. Some 
evidence is provided by findings of generally higher agency costs for firms that have fewer 
institutional investors and less monitoring. See Barzuza, supra note 177, at 40–41; Leuz et 
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Role of Institutions in Forest Management, 35 DEV. & CHANGE 435 (2004). 
 267. John Asker & Alexander Ljungqvist, Competition and the Structure of Vertical 
Relationships in Capital Markets, 118 J. POL. ECON. 599, 644 (2010). 
 268. The appropriate method for determining the precise number of a firm’s beneficial 
shareholders, particularly when there are multiple layers of ownership, is a nettlesome issue, 
which Langevoort and Thompson have thankfully begun to address. See Langevoort & 
Thompson, supra note 8, at 21–23. 
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exemption from compliance with FPDRs under the three-category mandatory 
disclosure regime proposed in this Article. 
C. Criteria for Granting a Contingent Exemption from Periodic Disclosure 
Requirements 
The final step in calibrating the three-category mandatory disclosure regime 
proposed in this Article is to describe what a firm with over $35 million in market 
capitalization and more than one hundred beneficial shareholders would be required 
to do to qualify for the new contingent exemption from a requirement to comply 
with FPDRs. Even firms that are large or have many shareholders can take steps to 
minimize the potential social harms from persistent under disclosure. It would be a 
mistake to force these firms to comply with FPDRs if appropriate ameliorative 
steps are taken. Each of the three justifications for imposing periodic disclosure 
requirements on a firm is caused by a market failure that an individual firm can 
take steps to mitigate in a variety of ways. 
I propose two pathways for firms to receive a contingent exemption from 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs in this Article.269 One pathway for firms to 
receive a contingent exemption would be for the firm to place significant 
restrictions on the tradability of the firm’s shares. An alternative pathway for firms 
to receive a contingent exemption would be for the firm to commit to participate in 
an acceptable alternative disclosure regime. Either pathway would provide a 
legitimate alternative to mandatory compliance with FPDRs. Providing precise 
specifications for each of these two pathways will be challenging, because the 
deleterious effects from a single firm under-disclosing information to investors is 
difficult to measure, whether produced by negative spillover effects, the costs of 
wasteful self-dealing, or the repercussions from under disclosure caused by positive 
interfirm externalities. This is a policy area where some element of experimentation 
and learning may be necessary. 
1. Restrictions on Tradability 
One pathway for firms to receive a contingent exemption from mandatory 
compliance with FPDRs would be for the firm to place significant restrictions on 
the tradability of the firm’s shares. An example of such restrictions would be 
restrictions that only allow shareholders to transfer their securities to family 
members, affiliates, or back to the firm.270 
A restriction on the tradability of a firm’s securities is likely to mitigate, either 
directly or indirectly, each of the three market failures that otherwise justify 
regulating a firm’s periodic disclosure practices. Most directly, negative spillover 
                                                                                                                 
 
 269. There may also be other pathways to achieve a similar ameliorative result, such as 
limiting trading of a firm’s securities to a particular venue and carefully controlling who can 
participate in trading on that venue. Considering such alternatives in detail is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 270. Schwartz notes that such a restriction would not be as onerous as it might seem, 
because many privately-held firms are owned solely by family members. See Schwartz, 
supra note 109, at 70–71. 
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effect from the trading of the securities of firms providing only limited amounts of 
information to investors would be eliminated, if trading of the firm’s securities is 
prohibited. Tradability restrictions should also help to reduce the extent to which 
opaque periodic disclosure policies are adopted to facilitate wasteful self-dealing. 
Measures that heighten the costs of exit, such as a restriction on tradability, will 
increase returns to investors from monitoring the firm. Restrictions on tradability 
should also mitigate the distortions in disclosure policies that can result from 
positive interfirm externalities, because restrictions on tradability make it more 
likely that disclosures provided to securities holders will remain confidential. 
There is historical precedent for allowing firms to avoid mandatory disclosure 
obligations by restricting the tradability of the firm’s shares. Bundling a 
commitment to provide adequate amounts of information with the right to trade 
securities is consistent with policies implemented by private trading venues, such 
as by the NYSE in 1910.271 Firms had also in the past used restrictions on share 
tradability as a form of private securities regulation.272  
Firms in the United States likely already have the power to restrict the 
transferability of their securities in this manner. According to an analysis by 
Jonathan Macey and Maureen O’Hara, a share transfer restriction placed in the 
firm’s articles of incorporation is enforceable, so long as the transfer restrictions are 
“reasonable under the circumstance[s].”273 Avoiding compliance with FPDRs 
would seem to provide such a reasonable basis for imposing restrictions on share 
tradability. In fact, in response to the growth of secondary markets for private 
equity, some firms have already voluntarily begun to issue securities with 
substantial restrictions on transferability.274 
A restriction on the tradability of the firm’s shares will not be without costs. 
Firm shareholders, and therefore firms themselves, benefit from the ability to trade 
the firm’s shares.275 However, there is not an affirmative requirement for any firm 
to restrict the tradability of its shares under the three-category mandatory disclosure 
regime proposed in this Article. Moreover, not all firms would even be required to 
restrict tradability or take an alternative ameliorative measure in order to avoid 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs under this proposal. Complying with FPDRs or 
providing an adequate substitute is only required of firms that are sufficiently large 
and their shareholders sufficiently numerous that there is prima facie evidence that, 
on average, the benefits of regulatory intervention into the firm’s periodic 
disclosure policies outweigh the costs. 
2. Alternative Disclosure Regimes 
A second way in which firms might receive a contingent exemption from 
compliance with FPDRs would be for the firm to commit to participate in an 
acceptable alternative disclosure regime. The possibility that firms might receive a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 271. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
 273. Jonathan Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Stock Transfer Restrictions and Issuer Choice 
in Trading Venues, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 587, 607 (2005). 
 274. Pollman, supra note 109, at 36 n.210. 
 275. Id. at 22–24. 
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contingent exemption from compliance with FPDRs by participating in an 
alternative disclosure regime has had several proponents in the past, including 
Stephen Choi, Andrew Guzman, and Roberta Romano.276 There are many 
alternative disclosure regimes that might be suggested as legitimate substitutes for 
mandatory compliance with FPDRs. These various alternative disclosure regimes 
can be separated into two broad categories.  
First, there are regulatory regimes that are generally similar to the FPDRs 
system. A disclosure regime generally similar to the FPDRs system would require 
disclosure of: (1) audited historical financial information, prepared in accordance 
with established accounting standards that includes an explanation of the 
accounting methods employed, (2) details of transactions between the firm and firm 
insiders, (3) restrictions on exit from the disclosure regime, and (4) a principles-
based obligation to disclose additional material financial information as necessary 
to make the information already disclosed not misleading. Examples of alternative 
disclosure regimes that fall into this first category are: disclosure requirements 
complied with by firms with operations based outside of the United States,277 the 
pared-down version of the FPDRs that can be used by emerging growth companies 
pursuant to the JOBS Act,278 and the pared-down version of the FPDRs that can be 
used by smaller reporting firms.279 Disclosure obligations required in connection 
with certain employee stock option distributions also fall into this first category, 
except that the financial information provided to employees does not need to be 
audited.280 There are no compelling reasons, based on the market failures identified 
in this Article, to require mandatory compliance with FPDRs for firms that commit 
to provide periodic disclosures pursuant to one of the disclosure regimes in this first 
category of alternative disclosure regimes.281 
The second broad category of alternative disclosure regimes is those that require 
substantially less disclosure than is required pursuant to FPDRs. The most notable 
examples of this second category of disclosure requirements are the rules 
stipulating the information a firm must provide when an affiliate wishes to sell 
                                                                                                                 
 
 276. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the 
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Romano, 
Empowering Investors, supra note 179. 
 277. Many firms with operations primarily outside the United States comply with 
International Finance Standards, which are established and maintained by the International 
Accounting Standard Board. See IFRS (2012), http://www.ifrs.org/Home.htm. 
 278. For example, the JOBS Act exempts firms that are determined to be emerging 
growth companies from the obligations created by Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 that auditors verify the absence of any material weakness in a firm’s internal control 
systems. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 103, 126 Stat. 306, 310 (2012). The reduced 
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time within the past five years. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 279. See supra note 253. 
 280. See supra note 99; Schwartz, supra note 109, at 37–38. 
 281. This conclusion is not the same as providing a sweeping endorsement of issuer 
choice with respect to periodic disclosure regimes, because the list of acceptable alternatives 
is restricted, and there may be legitimate reasons to require firms to comply with FPDRs 
other than the market failures considered in this Article. 
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shares that are not registered.282 In order for these types of affiliate sales to proceed, 
firms are required to disclose basic information about the nature of the business and 
the management team. The most far reaching of these minimal disclosure 
obligations is that the issuer makes available its “most recent balance sheet and 
profit and loss and retained earnings statements,” and the same for two preceding 
fiscal years, if the issuer was in existence.283 
Alternative disclosure regimes in which firms would provide substantially less 
disclosure than would be required if a firm were to comply with FPDRs, such as 
those disclosures required when affiliates sell unregistered shares, are more 
problematic as a substitute for FPDRs. There are reasons to be skeptical that a 
substantially lesser disclosure regime will successfully address market failures in 
the periodic disclosure of information about the firm that justify requiring 
compliance with FPDRs. One example of the shortcomings of this type of lesser 
disclosure is the absence of a requirement to disclose details of transactions 
between the firm and firm insiders. FPDRs specifically require disclosure of any 
such transactions with a value in excess of $120,000 for good reason.284 Required 
disclosure of information about transactions between the firm and its agents is 
crucial to reducing self-dealing costs, and reductions in wasteful self-dealing are 
one of the legitimate justifications for imposing disclosure requirements on certain 
firms.285 The reasons to require mandatory compliance with FPDRs would be 
poorly served if firms were allowed to substitute the disclosures required in 
conjunction with affiliate sales of unregistered equity for FPDRs. 
Allowing firms to avoid mandatory compliance with FPDRs by restricting share 
tradability or by committing to an acceptable alternative disclosure regime in the 
manner described above would provide a helpful degree of flexibility missing from 
the structure of the system currently used to determine which firms must comply 
with FPDRs. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 282. The specific disclosure requirement in this context is set out in Securities Act Rule 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of periodic financial disclosure 
regulation in the United States in order to better understand when firms should be 
required to comply with FPDRs. 
The analysis begins with a review of the history of periodic disclosure 
regulation in the United States. Understanding the origins of the rules used to 
determine which firms must comply with FPDRs does not resolve the normative 
question of how to determine when firms should be required to comply with these 
requirements. This leads to the second Part of this Article, which provides an up-to-
date and comprehensive analysis of the economic justifications for requiring firms 
to comply with FPDRs. Recent findings had not previously been integrated into the 
scholarship on mandatory periodic disclosure regulation. 
The final Part of this Article builds on the historical and economic analysis in 
the first two Parts to generate specific policy recommendations about when firms 
should be required to comply with FPDRs. The first conclusion is that changing 
from a two-category to a three-category system for determining when firms should 
be required to comply with FPDRs will allow firms more latitude to select periodic 
disclosure practices that are appropriate given their particular costs and benefits of 
disclosure. To implement this new three-category system firms should be granted 
an automatic exemption from compliance with FPDRs, if either: (1) the firm’s 
market capitalization is below $35 million, or (2) the firm has fewer than one 
hundred beneficial shareholders. Firms that exceed these threshold levels should be 
allowed to choose between: (1) complying with FPDRs, (2) placing substantial 
restrictions on the tradability of the firm’s securities, or (3) committing to an 
acceptable alternative periodic disclosure regime. 
Securities markets are steadily evolving, and securities regulations need to be 
appropriately updated and modified to reflect these changing circumstances. 
Companies like Facebook should not be compelled to go public, because of an 
antiquated system of securities regulation. Nor should firms, by manipulating the 
uninformed fiat of Congress, be able to easily avoid a disclosure regime that is of 
proven value. Scholars can assist legislators and regulators in this process by 
carefully delineating: the history of a regulation, the legitimate purposes served by 
the regulation, and how best to realize these purposes in the face of changing 
market realities. The goal of this Article is to provide such an analysis with respect 
to the rules used to determine when firms should be required to comply with 
FPDRs. 
